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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty: Jurisdiction over longshoremen and harbor workers.-
Injured maritime workers have long been faced with the problem of closely
analyzing the fact situation under which they were injured in order to deter-
mine what relief they may seek. The alternatives are (a) state compensa-
tion acts or the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act,' if they
qualify as longshoremen or harbor workers; and (b) the federal legislation
covering seamen if they are sufficiently engaged in navigation to be classed
as "members of the crew." The Longshoremen's Act is the exclusive remedy
for those who come within its scope.2 The Seamen's Act3 provides that "any
seaman" who shall suffer personal injury or death in the course of his em-
ployment shall have the benefit of the Federal Employer's Liability Act.4
As between the coverage of state compensation acts and the federal com-
pensation act, a long line of United States Supreme Court decisions has
developed the rule that an injury or death, even on navigable waters, may
fall under the state compensation act if the matter is "maritime but local."15
If the employee's work is "maritime" in character, the state act is excluded,
but the question remains whether to class'the maritime work under the Sea-
men's Act, which is not a compensation statute, or under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act, which is. Section 3 of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act provides for compensation in respect of the disability
or death of an employee which occurs upon navigable waters of the United
States and any dry docks if recovery for the disability or death may not
validly be provided by state law and if the injured or deceased is not a
master or member of a crew nor a person engaged to load or unload a vessel
of under eighteen tons net.0
John Schumann was drowned while serving his employer, the Chicago
Coal and Dock Company, in navigable waters of the United States on a
vessel of 372 net tons used for fueling steamboats and other marine equip-
144 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. §§ 901 et seq. (Supp. 1939).244 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. § 905 (Supp. 1939).
341 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 688 (1928).
435 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 (1928).
5Sultan Ry. v. Dept. of Labor & Industries of Washington, 277 U. S. 135, 48 Sup.
Ct. 505 (1928); Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of
California, 276 U. S. 467, 48 Sup. Ct. 346 (1926); State Industrial Board of New
York v. Terry & Tench Co., Inc., 273 U. S. 639, 47 Sup. Ct. 90 (1926) ; Millers
Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59, 46 Sup. Ct. 194 (1926), noted (1926)
14 GEo. L. J. 185; Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rhode, 257 U. S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. 157
(1921), noted (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 368, (1922) 17 ILL. L. REv. 318, (1922) 20 Mica.
L. REv. 535, (1922) 31 YALLE L. J. 561. See RoBINsoN, ADIaAurLTY (1939) § 14,
pp. 101-109.
044 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. § 903 (Supp. 1939). Section 3 of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides, "'Coverage'-Compen-
sation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee,
but only if the disability results from an injury occurring on the navigable waters of
the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state
law. No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of-(1) A
master or member of a crew of any vessel nor any person engaged by the master to
load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net ..
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ment. He had no living or dining quarters on the ship but was called daily
as his services were desired. He had signed no seaman's "articles" nor were
they necessary in this kind of work. His principal duty was to facilitate the
flow of coal from his ship to the vessel being fueled; occasionally he cleared
the boat and threw out the ship's rope in docking the vessel. For purposes
of filling the ship's certified complement, he was considered both a "seaman"
and a "member of the crew."' 7 In South Chicago Coal and Dock Ca. v.
Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, 60 Sup. Ct. 544 (1940), the United States Supreme
Court held that an award under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act s could not be upset by a District Court of the United
States, as there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the Deputy
Commissioner that the decedent was not "a member of the crew" within the
meaning of the Act.
The courts have adopted the same tests of coverage under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Act as are required for admiralty jurisdiction
over torts.9 The employee must sustain injury on navigable waters of the
United States in the course of his employment.10 His injuries, however,
must occur under circumstances which preclude state compensation laws from
providing for recovery. 1
Although the general maritime law may to a certain degree be affected
by state legislation, the United States Supreme Court has held that where
the matter is such as to require uniformity throughout the states, a state
compensation act cannot be applied to workers injured on navigable waters
while engaged in work of a maritime nature,' 2 and that an Act of Congress
so providing is unconstitutional. 13 Thus a state compensation act could not
cover a longshoreman injured on shipboard while unloading a vessel.' 4 The
7The deceased was classed as a deckhand. The Circuit Court of Appeals report of
the case [104 F. (2d) 522, 524 (C. C. A. 7th 1939)] states that the ship's certificate
of inspection required that "Included in the entire crew hereinafter specified and desig-
nated there must be 1 licensed master and pilot, 1 licensed chief engineer, 3 Seamen,
1 fireman. If deceased were counted as a member of the crew, the full complement
of the ship was present, otherwise not." (Italics supplied.) The deceased had no
"articles" nor were they necessary in this kind of work.
844 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. § 903 (Supp. 1939).
9Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U. S. 647, 55 Sup. Ct. 884 (1935), noted
(1935) 3 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 321, (1935) 34 MIcH. L. REv. 281; T. Smith & Son, Inc.
v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179, 48 Sup. Ct. 228 (1930). See RoBiNsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939)§ 15, p. 120.
IONew Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. McManigal, 87 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
3144 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. § 903 (A) (Supp. 1939) ; New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. McManigal, sitpra note 10.
'
2 Nogueira v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R.R., 281 U. S. 128, 50 Sup. Ct. 303 (1929),
noted (1929) 25 ILL. L. REV. 304; London v. Industrial Commission, 279 U. S. 109, 49
Sup. Ct. 296 (1929) ; Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255, 37 Sup. Ct. 545
(1916), noted (1917) 85 CENT. L. J. 57; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S.
205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524 (1916), noted (1917) 3 CORNELL L. Q. 38, (1917) 6 CALIF. L. REv.
69, (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 703, (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 132.131Cnickerbocker Ice Company v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920),
noted (1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 685, (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 82, (1920) 18 MicEr. L.
REv. 793, (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 925.
14 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 12.
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Supreme Court, however, has developed a companion rule that even if the
injury occurs on navigable waters, recovery may be had in state courts
under state compensation statutes if the nature of the employment is "local"
in character and has only an incidental relation to navigation and com-
merce.15 Thus the Supreme Court has sustained recovery under state com-
pensation statutes where a diver submerged from a barge anchored thirty-
five feet from the bank to remove an abandoned set of ways formerly used
for the launching of ships,' 6 and where a carpenter was injured while com-
pleting a bulkhead to enclose certain tanks on a substantially completed ship
already launched.' 7 These decisions, therefore, complete the formula for
determining whether the state statute or the federal law applies.
If the harbor worker is engaged in duties actually affecting the navigation
of the ship, he is a "member of the crew" and thus beyond the scope of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and within that
of the Seamen's Act.18' An employee within the "crew" class has the right
of election offered seamen under the Seamen's Act 9 to maintain an action
under general maritime law or to bring action under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act 2 0 The mere fact that the employee may make trips beyond
the harbor, however, will not make him a member of the crew within the
meaning of the Longshoremen's Act.2 '
If the longshoreman or harbor worker is injured on land, or on a dock
other than a dry dock, his problem is simplified as he is then not subject to
admiralty jurisdiction and his recovery, if any, is under state law.22
In the principal case, the precise question was whether or not there was
sufficient evidence to support the Deputy Commissioner's finding that the
decedent was not a "member of the crew" within the meaning of the Long-
shoremen's statute. The Circuit Court of Appeals considering it significant
that Schumann was not required to do any work while the vessel was in
motion, and that his only duty relating to navigation was the task of throw-
ing the lines in making fast to dock; but it also stressed the facts that the
decedent was paid an hourly wage, that he slept at home and boarded off
15Sultan Ry. v. Dept. of Labor & Industries of Washington, Alaska Packers Asso-
ciation v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, State Industrial Board of New
York v. Terry & Tench Co., Inc., Millers Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, Grant
Smith-Porter Co. v. Rhode, all supra note 3; RoBiNsox, ADnsALTY (1939) § 14, pp.
101-109.
16Millers Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, supra note 3.
17Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rhode, supra note 3.
'SThe Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act exempts "a master
or member of the crew of any vessel ... " from its operation. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927),
33 U. S. C. A. § 903 (Supp. 1939).
1941 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 688 (1928) ; Diomede v. Lowe, 87 F. (2d) 296
(C. C. A. 2d 1937).2035 ST-AT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 51 et seq. (1928).
2
'Harper v. Parker, 9 F. Supp. 744 (D. Md. 1935); De Wald v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 71 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 4th 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 581, 55 Sup. Ct.
94 (1934).22Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U. S. 647, 55 Sup. Ct. 844 (1935);
Nogueira v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry., 281 U. S. 128, 50 Sup. Ct. 303 (1930) ; Smith
& Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179, 48 Sup. Ct. 288 (1928) ; State Industrial Commission
v. Nordenholt, 259 U. S. 263, 42 Sup. Ct. 473 (1922).
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ship and that he was called daily as his services were desired.23 In a case
where the employee was a deckhand but may have had slightly more im-
portance in the navigation of the ship, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held him to be "a member of the crew" but stressed the fact that though
not an articled seaman he was fed and quartered aboard the dredge.Y The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held the sole person in charge of barges
which were not operated under their own power to be neither a "master" nor
"member of the crew" but again the court stressed the fact that the employee
lived off ship.25  Where, however, the deceased wheeled and shoveled coal,
scrubbed decks, handled the lines in making landings and in passing through
locks, a District Court recently held that he was not a member of the crew
within the meaning of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act even
though he boarded and slept on board during trips. 26 Also, a District Court
decision has recently held that a cook on a tugboat was within the coverage
of the Act 2
7
The decision in the principal case seems just on its facts and indicates
an unwillingness on the part of the courts to deprive a worker of the bene-
fits of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act unless
he is clearly engaged in the navigation of the ship. Where the courts will
draw the line is uncertain, but it now seems that to be a "member of the
crew" the worker must be engaged in the navigation of the ship and not
merely assist others who are engaged in navigation. This is true even
though, for purposes other than compensation, the worker might be con-
sidered a seaman.
William G. DeLamater
23South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Basseti, 104 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 7th 1939).241n Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 94 F. (Zd) 190 (C. C. A. 5th 1938), de-
ceased was hired by the master of a dredge, was fed and quartered aboard her and
daily worked eight hours on a scow affiliated with the dredge. On the scow he handled
the lines, attended to dumping and cleaning the scow at sea, and did what was necessary
to her navigation. He had no seaman's articles, however, and was not shown to be
an experienced sailor. He was employed under the title "deckhand." The court held
the employee to be a "member of the crew" within the meaning of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, stating that "Burrows, though not an articled
seaman, was permanently attached to the dredge and her attendant scow as a member
of the ship's company." 94 F. (2d) 190, 193 (C. C. A. 5th 1938).25In DeWald v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 71 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 4th 1934), the
bargeman's duties were to check and supervise loading and unloading of cargo and to
keep the records thereof. He was the sole worker on barges which were not navigated
under their own power. He was held not to be a "master" or "member of the crew"
so as to prevent recovery under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act. The court ruled that such work as he did in making fast lines at dock or
pumping water out of the barges was incidental to his main employment. It stressed
the facts that DeWald did not live upon the barge but went home every night and that
the barges were not navigated under their own power.
20Blaske v. Bassett, 1940 A. M. C. 1319 (D. Mo. 1940).27Mechling Barge Line v. Bassett, 1940 A. M. C. 1323 (N. D. Ill. 1940).
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Aviation: Limitation of passenger liability: Is airplane a "Vessel"?-
Dollins v. Pan-American Grace Airways, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 487, 1939 A. M. C.
691, 1939 U. S. Av. R. 6 (S. D. N. Y. .1939) 1 and Noakes v. Imperial Air-
ways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412, 1939 A. M. C. 1048, 1939 U. S. Av. R.
1 (S. D. N. Y. 1939)2 involve deaths of passengers on seaplanes which
crashed into the sea. In both cases the airlines sought limitations of lia-
bility under the admiralty rules3 applied to owners of vessels. The court
in both decided that a seaplane was not a "vessel" within the meaning of
the statutO dealing with limitation of marine liability. The increase of
air travel, national and international, coupled with recent fatalities,5 makes
the question of limitation of passenger liability pertinent. This topic will
be discussed (1) under admiralty rules, (2) under the Warsaw Convention,
and (3) under common law liability.
The attempt to seek advantage of the admiralty doctrines in the instant
cases is understandable. For some purposes the seaplane is subject to
admiralty law such as harbor traffic rules" and salvage.7 The same reasons
supporting limitation of marine passenger liability could be applied to air
lines.8 However, in the few cases9 that sought an advantage in the mari-
INoted (1939) 10 AIR L. REv. 410.2Noted (1940) 8 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 852.8RoBINsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) §§ 117-124.
4REV. STAT. §§ 4283-4289 (1877), 46 U. S. C. A. § 183(a) (1936): "The liability of
the owner of any vessel, whether American or Foreign, for any ...loss, damage, or
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage or forfeiture ...
occasioned . . . without privity or knowledge of such owners shall not . . . exceed
the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel and her freight then
pending." Section 183(b) : "In case of . . . seagoing vessel, if amount of owner's
liability as limited under 183 (a) is insufficient to pay all losses in full and the portion
* . . applicable to the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury is
less than $60 per ton of such vessel's tonnage, such portion shall be increased to an
amount equal to $60 a ton, to be available only for the payment of losses in respect
of loss of life or bodily injury. If such portion so increased is insufficient to pay such
losses in full, they shall be paid therefrom in proportion to their respective amounts."5Crash involving Senator Lundeen and 24 others, TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 9, 1940, p. 17
and crash of United Air Line plane in Utah killing 10 people, N. Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1940, p. 17, col. 2.6Commerce Act Regulations 60.64: Aircraft on water-Between sunset and sunrise
all aircraft which are on the surface of water and not under way or which are moored
or anchored in navigation lanes, shall show a white light visible for at least two miles
in all directions. 60.68: Fog signals-In fog, mist or heavy weather an aircraft on
the water in navigation lanes shall signal its presence by a sound device emitting a
signal for about five seconds at one minute intervals. 60.91: Aircraft on water-Sea-
planes on the water shall navigate according to the laws and regulations of the U. S.
government in the navigation and operation of watercraft, except as otherwise pro-
vided in these regulations.7RoaixsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) 715. The Habana Convention of 1928, to which the
United States adheres, and the Paris Air Navigation Convention of 1919 both provide
that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, salvage of aircraft at sea is to be
governed by the principles of maritime law. For the latest development in this field
see Knauth, The Aviation Salvage at Sea Convention of 1938 (1939) 10 Am L. REv.
146. See also Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty (1935) 6 AIR L. REv. 309, 310.
sRoBINsox, ADMIRALTY (1939) § 117. See also Rittenberg, Limitation of Airline
Passenger Liability (1935) 6 J. AIR L. 365, 382, 383.9United States v. Northwest Air Service, 80 F. (2d) 804 (C. C. A. 9th 1934) (mar-
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time classification, courts have not tended to treat seaplanes as vessels.10
Besides possible procedural advantages," there would always be a distinct
financial advantage' 2 to the airlines if admiralty rules on the limitation of
liability were applied. If the recent amendments providing that tonnage
sums for the victims of disasters on seagoing vessels do not apply to the
airplane, the surrender value of a crashed seaplane would usually be nil
because everything is lost. Even if the $60 a ton provision 13 were availed
of there would be but a small fund because seaplanes have no substantial
tonnage. This would be unfair to the passenger. He would pay too great
a proportion of the cost of developing aviation if subjected to such a limi-
tation. The court acted properly in the instant cases in denying limitation
of passenger liability according to the admiralty rules.
There has been, however, considerable willingness to let the passenger take
a share in the cost of aeronautical development. In international air travel,
the leading nations have adopted the Warsaw Convention' 4 which has a
limitation of passenger liability of 125,000 francs.' 5 A higher limitation
may be conttacted for but any lower would be void. A few English cases'"
time lien denied because seaplane not vessel); Watson v. R.C.A. Victor Co. Inc., 50
Lloyds L. Rep. 77, 1935 U. S. Av. R. 147 (1934) (salvage claim denied because sea-
plane not vessel); Wendorf v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S. W. (2d)
99 (1927) (seaplane held not vessel but aircraft thus freeing insurance company from
liability) : Foss v. Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (W. D. Wash. 1914) (libel for
plane repairs denied). But see People ex rel. Cushing v. Smith, 206 App. Div. 642, 198
N. Y. Supp. 940 (3d Dep't 1923) (hydroplane vessel as far as muffler requirement on
lake concerned) and Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 133
N. E. 371 (1921) (seaplane held vessel in denying state law compensation claim).
10 See definition of vessel in Rav. STAT. § 3 (1870), 1 U. S. C. A. § 3 (1926) : "Every
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used or capable of being, used as
a means of transportation on water." This would seem broad enough to include a
seaplane. Compare supra note 6 for times when seaplane is treated as vessel.
'lKnauth, Aviation and Admiralty (1935) 6 Am L. Rav. 226, 230 (no jury, admiralty
procedure).1 2ROBINso, ADMIRALTY (1939) 930 (value of vessel surrendered is value after disas-
ter or end of the voyage).1 3RoBINsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) § 123 (owner must supply additional funds up to
$60 a ton of gross tonnage. Within limits of vessel's value, death and injury claims
compete with other liens in usual order of priorities; but added funds are allotted solely to
the death and personal injury claims). Compare the proposed Uniform Aviation Lia-
bility Act, (1938) 9 J. Am L. 179, where maximum amount for one passenger is
$10,000 and maximum amount for plane is graded according to horsepower with a- top
limit of $100,000 regardless of number of passengers.
144 WiLLIs ToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 1113A. The
following countries have adopted the Convention: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Czecho-
slovakia, Danzig, France, Germany, Great Britain and British Colonies, Hungary,
India, Irish Free State, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Mexico, The Netherlands, Poland,
Roumania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, United States, and Yugoslavia.
15 This is of a standard fineness worth $8300. 'Since the Convention allows awards to
be paid in national currencies, some difficulty may arise about foreign exchange and the.
time when it should be computed.
IGGrein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., (1937) 1 K. B. 50, 1936 U. S. Av. R. 184, noted
(1937) 22 CORNErL L. Q. 561 (death case where Convention limit applied on round
trip ticket) ; Phillippson v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., (1939) A. C. 332, 1939 U. S. Av. R.
63 (Convention's later adoption by Belgium held not to relate back to time of shipment
of gold); Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 1936 U. S. Av. R. 39
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have arisen under this Convention.1 7 Under such circumstances the airline
operator can calculate his risk. Air traffic deaths are often spectacular with
the consequent possibility of high jury verdicts. Since both the United
States and Bermuda have adopted the Warsaw Convention, it covers the
transit in the Noakes case and it is submitted that the limitation of that
Convention would apply.
Limitation of passenger liability in domestic air travel is governed by the
common law. The Civil Aeronautics Act makes no mention of limitation of
passenger liability despite the adherence of the United States to the Warsaw
Convention. With the background of railroad decisions,'- courts have
allowed no limitations for injuries or death. Many decided cases have given
awards higher'9 than the Warsaw Convention or the proposed Uniform
Aviation Liability Act.20 On the practical side, proof or disproof of negli-
gence is often impossible in air crashes because of the completeness of the
wreck and the total loss of lives as in the Dollins case. Common law lia-
bility imposes a heavy burden on the airlines. A disastrous crash could dis-
rupt the financial structure of an airline and at the same timethose injured
would run the risk of being inadequately compensated. A large jury verdict
is of little value if the line cannot pay it; and insurance against this liability
is made difficult because of the problematic amounts of verdicts.
All interests might be better served if some method of limitation of pas-
senger liability similar to the Warsaw Convention or the proposed Uniform
Aviation Liability Act were adopted as part of the Civil Aeronautics Act to
handle the problem in domestic air transportation. With such a limitation,
insurance actuaries could figure coverage accurately and the airlines should
then be required to carry insurance or reserves at all times equal to the
maximum liability.
John M. Keane
(consignment note did not conform properly and no limitation allowed on shipment
of gold).
'
7 The Convention does not apply if one of the termini is located in the country of
a non-participating party. For a discussion see Sullivan, The Codification of Air Car-
rier Liability by International Convention (1936) 71 J. Am L. 1, 8-13.
IsSee RAtenberg, Limitation of Airline Passenger Liability (1935) 6 J. AIR L. 362
(treats railroad background); Knauth, Compulsory Aviation Liability Insurance in
Great Britain and the United States (1937) 8 J. AIR L. 461, 466.
19Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, 266 N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692 (1935)($75,274 reduced to $25,000) ; Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, 66 F. (2d) 710
(C. C. A. 3d 1933) ($56,000 reduced to $40,000) ; McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying
Service, 269 Ill. App. 502, (1933) ($10,000 affirmed); Curtiss-Wright Flying Service
v. Williamson, 51 S. W. (2d) 1047 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ($25,000 affirmed); Ziser
v. Colonial Western Airways, 10 N. J. Misc. 1118, 162 Atl. 591 (Sup. Ct. 1932)
($46,000 reduced to $25,000) ; Boele v. Colonial Western Airways, 10 N. J. Misc.
217, 158 Atl. 214 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ($38,000 reduced to $25,000) ; Henderson v. Colonial
Western Airways, 10 N. J. Misc. 217, 158 Atl. 440 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ($33,900 reduced
to $15,000).
20(1938) 9 J. AIR L. 179 (text of proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act. Approach
is that of workmen's compensation statutes with list of awards for varying injuries
regardless of negligence).
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Constitutional Law: Compulsory flag salute: Interference with religious
freedom.-The present war has brought to the United States a feeling of
insecurity and an emphasis upon national defense. It has brought also
an attitude of suspicion toward non-conformists within our ranks. And,
as we begin to divide the population into those who are with us and those
who are against us, there has come the danger that patriotism will degen-
erate into a popular fetish.1 This danger the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S.
586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1940), does not mitigate.
In accordance with a rule of a local school board having the force of state
law, two children, one twelve and the other ten, were expelled from the
public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to saluate the flag
as a part of a daily school exercise. In thus refusing they were following
the injunctions of their parents who were members of a religious group
which believes that such a form of respect is akin to idolatry and contrary
to the commands of the Bible.2 At the father's suit, the District Court3
enjoined the school authorities from continuing to require participation in
the ceremony as a condition of his children's attendance at the school on
the ground that the rule in question impaired the religious freedom guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. • But the United States Supreme Court
reversed a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals4 sustaining this injunc-
tion. The highest court, speaking through Mr. justice Frankfurter, decided
that the object of national unity justified the requirement. The justices
relied upon the legislature's finding that the method chosen was appropriate
to that end. Mr. Justice Stone dissented.
Although the First Amendment 5 is a limitation upon the national gov-
ernment only and not upon the states,0 in the late case of Cantwell v. Con-
necticut7 the Supreme Court held squarely that religious freedom is one
of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision was
foreshadowed by repeated dicta to that effect.8 The constitution of every
1CoNSOLATIoN, an organ of Jehovah's Witnesses, in the issue of May 29, 1940, con-
tains an impressive list of indignities suffered by members of the sect because of their
religious beliefs.
2This belief is the result of a literal interpretation of Exodus 20: 4, 5.
It is interesting to note that, while demanding tolerance for themselves, the members
of the sect to which the plaintiff belonged (Jehovah's Witnesses) do not seem to be ready
to tolerate the religious convictions of others. See High, Armageddon Inc. in SATURDAY
EvENING POST, Sept. 14, 1940, p. 18.
324 F. Supp. 271 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
4108 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 3d 1939).
5
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."
OPermali v. New Orleans, 3 How. 609, 11 L. ed. 739 (U. S. 1845).
7310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900 (1940).
SHamilton v. University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197 (1934) ; Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 392, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923).
The privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment, however, will not pro-
tect the individual in his religious beliefs, as the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21
L. ed. 394 (U. S. 1873), early limited the privileges of citizens of the United States
to those which spring from the character of the United States as a national govern-
ment. For a time, following Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935),
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state has a similar guaranty.9 The liberty thus guaranteed is not, however,
absolute, so that the problem has been one of defining limits. This problem
has been rendered acute by numerous state flag laws and rules of local
school boards having the force of state law.10 Although there have been
several decisions in the state courts sustaining these statutes, and appeals
from three of these decisions were dismissed as involving no substantial
federal question,'1 the Gabitis case is the first case sustaining such a statute
in which an opinion has been written by the Supreme Court.
In dealing with these flag cases, the courts may employ one or more lines
of reasoning in order to reach the conclusion that the statutes are consti-
tutional. Thus, the tribunal may say that the particular belief or practice
is so foreign to the culture of the American people that it cannot be. called
"religious.'- 2  Proponents of this. approach point to the language of Mr.
Justice Field in the nineteenth century case of Davis v. Beaon ,' 3 where, in
speaking of bigamy and polygamy, he stated, "To call their advocacy a
tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind."1 4 Under this
method of solution the standard set up ought to be based on the existing
mores and not on the personal opinions of the judge.15
Another method used by the courts is to adopt a subjective test and recog-
nize the right of the individual to make his own decision, but sustain the
statute on the basis of the orthodox doctrine that the police power of the
sovereign state supersedes personal liberties where the public interest re-
quires it.' 6 This fundamental doctrine was invoked in the Gobitis case.
The problem is one of balancing the conflicting interests of the state and of
the individual, and the courts have frequently inquired into the reasonable-
ness of the solution reached by the legislature. Thus, in considering other
cases where the contention has been advanced that a statute impairs free-
it was thought that a broader interpretation would be given to the clause, but the
recent decision in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 60 Sup. Ct. 406 (1940) reverses
the Colgate case. But cf., Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
9E.g., N. Y. CONST. (1938) Art. 1, § 3.
'
0 See THE GAG ox TEACHING (2d rev. ed. 1937).
lGabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. (2d) 85, 82 P. (2d) 391 -(1938), appeal dis-
missed, 305 U. S. 267, 59 Sup. Ct. 786 (1939); Leoles v. Landers, 184 Ga. 580, 192
S. E. 278 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U. S. 656, 58 Sup. Ct. 364 (1937); Hering
v. State Bd. of Ed., 117 N. J. L. 455, 189 Atl. 629 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 118 N. J. L.
566, 194 At. 177 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U. S. 624, 58 Sup. Ct. 752 (1937).
12Leoles v. Landers, 184 Ga. 580, 192 S. E. 218 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U. S.
656, .58 Sup. Ct. 364 (1937); Nicholls v. Mayor, 297 Mass. 565, 7 N. E. (2d) 577(1937) ; Hering v. State Bd. of Ed., 117 N. J. L. 455, 189 At. 629 (Sup. Ct. 1937),
aff'd, 118 N. J. L. 566, 194 Atl. 177 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U. S. 624, 58 Sup. Ct.
752 (1937) ; People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 279 N. Y. 523, 28 N. E. (2d) 840 (1939).
'3133 U. S. 333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299 (1890).
141d. at 341.
15Aside from any standard, the court is free to inquire into the bona fides of the
beliefs. North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Ill. 296, 27 N. E. 54 (1891) ; Coale v. Pear-
son, 165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54 (1933), appeal dismissed, 290 U. S. 597, 54 Sup. Ct.
131 (1933).
'
0 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 48 Sup. Ct. 246 (1928); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1924); cf. Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444,
58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938).
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dom of conscience, the courts have held that the necessity for peace, safety,
and good order in the community was sufficient to justify a restriction on
religious freedom where the right claimed was the unlicensed practice of
mediciney17 a refusal to be vaccinated,' 8 doing business on Sunday,19 shout-
ing,2 0 and the use of sacramental wine.21  In the principal case, the Court
says the object of national solidarity is a justifiable end. Nor is a statute
designed to promote this end new, for it has had its forerunner in legislation
outlawing the teaching of foreign languages to young children. Those acts
were held to be unconstitutional, the courts declaring that there was no
emergency present sufficient to render knowledge by a child of some language
other than English so clearly harmful as to justify the infringement of
fundamental liberties.2 2 Assuming that such an emergency exists today,
is a rule requiring a child to commit what he considers to be a sin an effec-
tive method of teaching a love of country?
Still another method of reasoning has been to say that the state has not
infringed any liberties because the child is not forced to attend public school;
if the burden upon the individual is great, he can go to a private school.
2 3
A patent objection to this argument is that attendance at some school is re-
quired, and frequently the parent cannot support his child at a private
school. In such a situation, it seems mere verbiage to speak of a "choice."
There are certain instances, however, where the idea of a choice is relevant.
Thus, in Hamilton v. University of California,24 the state required students
at the University of California to study military science and tactics. When
the plaintiff objected and sued for a writ compelling the Regents to admit
him into the University without taking the course, the Supreme Court
pointed out to him that no one was compelling him to go to the University
of California, and that there were other colleges within the state where such
instruction was not required. It is pertinent to note, moreover, that training
in the uses of weapons of defense seems to bear a closer relationship to
the welfare of the public than a requirement that school children go through
the formal gestures of saluting the flag.
The idea of a choice has also weighed heavily with the court in considering
state laws requiring the reading of the Bible in public schools.2 5 Generally,
under these laws, the teacher is instructed to make no comments. In such
17State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P. (2d) 1083 (1932).
'SVonegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172 (1934).
19Elliot v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 Pac. 340 (1926).
20City of Louisiana v. Bottoms, 300 S. W. 316 (Mo. 1927).21Shapiro v. Lyle, 30 F. (2d) 971 (W. D. Wash. 1929), appeal dismissed, 36 F. (2d)
1021 (C. C. A. 7th 1930).22Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U. S. 404, 43 Sup. Ct. 628 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923).23Leoles v. Landers, 184 Ga. 580, 192 S. E. 218 (1938), appeal disnissed, 302 U. S.
656, 58 Sup. Ct. 364 (1937) ; Hering v. State Bd. of Ed., 117 N. J. L. 455, 189 Atl.
629 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 118 N. J. L. 566, 194 Atl. 177 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303
U. S. 624, 58 Sup. Ct. 752 (1937).
24293 U. S. 245, 54 Sup. Ct. 197 (1934).
25"At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each and every public school, upon each and every school day, by the teacher
in charge. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 24, § 1555.
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a situation, the validity of the statute may depend upon whether the pupil
has the option of leaving the room while the reading is in progress, for the
legislation is generally upheld if such an option is present.26 Where there
is no choice, the courts are more loath to sanction the requirement. 27
Louis Levene
Contracts: Wills: Contract benefiting third persons as testamentary
disposition.- A mortgagee, in entering into an agreement of extension of
mortgage from Dec. 18, 1934, to March 7, 1940, provided that in event of
her death prior to the latter date the interest and principal, as due, were
to be paid one-half to her brother and one-half to heirs of a deceased sister.
The mortgagee died shortly thereafter without having notified the donees
of the agreement in their favor. On the next interest date, the plaintiffs,
a brother, nieces and nephews of the deceased, claimed the payment by virtue
of the extension agreement. The deceased mortgagee's administrator made a
similar claim. In doubt as to whom he should pay, the mortgagor refused
to 'pay any claimants and, on being sued by said relatives, impleaded the
administrator. Refusing to interpret this as a third party beneficiary con-
tract, the court held the extension agreement testamentary in nature and
invalid because of non-compliance with the Statute of Wills.' McCarthy
v. Pieret, 281 N. Y. 407, 24 N. E. (2d) 102 (1939) .2
As held by the court, it is clear that the plaintiffs' claim was insupportable
upon the theory of an inter vivos gift. It is universally stated that "If the
gift does not take effect as an executed and completed transfer to the donee,
either legally or equitably, during the life of the donor, it is a testamentary
disposition, good only when made by a valid will."3 The donor's continued
power of control or revocation, seized upon by the court here as the basis
of its decision, is fatal to the theory of an accomplished inter ',ivos gift.4
The law of trusts would seem to be to the same effect in an analogous situ-
2 SPeople v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927) ; Wilkerson v. City of Rome,
152 Ga. 762, 110 S. E. 895 (1921). See Kaplan v. School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214
N. W. 18 (1927).
27Case upholding the practice: Donohue v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854). Contra:
People v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N. E. 251 (1910); Herold v. Board
of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915) ; Nessle v. Hum, 2 Ohio Dec. 60(1894) ; State v. Scheve, 65 Neb., 853, 91 N. W. 846 (1902).
IN. Y. Cons. Laws, c. 13 (DECEDENT ESTATE LAw) § 21.2From the majority opinion, written by Chief Judge Crane, Judges Lehman and
Loughran dissented without opinion.
328 C. J. 624, quoted by the court. 281 N. Y. at 409. The statement is also borne out
by the following recent cases: Leonard v. Campbell, 189 So. 839 (Fla. 1939); Cutts
v. Najdrowski, 121 N. J. Eq. 546, 191 Atl. 867 (1937) ; In. re Fitzpatrick's Estate, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 280 (Surr. Ct. 1940). But cf. Montgomery v. Reeves, 167 Ga. 623, 146
S. E. 311 (1929).4
"This is the ever recurring case of an attempt at once to give property and keep it,
and as long as men keep trying to do that lawyers will not starve." Denison, C. J.,
in Griffith v. Sands, 84 Colo. 456, 457, 271 Pac. 191 (1928).
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ation. Although the power to revoke a trust coupled with a reservation
of a life interest in the settlor does not, in and of itself, make the trust
testamentary, 5 the addition of general control normally results in a testa-
mentary disposition. 6
The analogy of a life insurance policy which reserves to the insured
the power to change the beneficiary would be troublesome were it not for
the fact that insurance law is recognized to be sui generis.7  The whole
beneficial enjoyment of the gift is necessarily postponed until the death of
the donor; and the validity of the donative transfer is not affected by the
power explicitly reserved8 to surrender the policy or change the beneficiary.
The courts have refused to apply a doctrine similar to that of the insurance
cases to property dispositions other than tentative trusts of savings bank
deposits.9
The court brusquely dismissed the contention of the applicability of
Seaver v. Ransom,"° the case generally deemed to have opened the way for
introduction of the donee beneficiary doctrine into the law of New York.
However, it seems that the court well might have applied the third party
beneficiary theory in the instant case, holding that the plaintiffs, as donee
beneficiaries, acquired a vested" though defeasible contractual right imme-
diately upon the signing of the agreement.12 No right to revoke or alter
GAdams v. Hagerot, 34 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 8th 1929); Cramer v. Hartford-
Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 AtI. 139, 73 A. L. R. 201, 209 (1929) ; Bear
v. Milliken Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N. E. 349 (1929) ; Mersereau v. Bennet, 124
App. Div. 413, 108 N. Y. Supp. 868 (1st Dep't 1908) ; Cleveland Trust Co. v. White,
58 Ohio App. 339, 16 N. E. (2d) 588 (1938); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEES (1935)
§ 994.,
GRussell v. Webster, 213 Mass. 491, 100 N. E. 637 (1913) ; Tunnell's Estate, 325
Pa. 554, 190 Ati. 906 (1937) ; Darling v. Mattoon State Bank, 189 Wis. 117, 207 N. W.
254 (19Z6) ; cf. Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 112 A. L. R. 643,
649 (1937). There is, however, considerable authority to the effect that the reservation
of a certain amount of control by the settlor does not make the trust testamentary.
Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925); Davis v. Rossi,
326 Mo. 911, 34 S. W. (2d) 81 (1930); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 57.2. An excep-
tion to the general principal exists in the realm of tentative trusts of savings bank
deposits. Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904); Scanlon's Estate,
133 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 2 A. (2d) 567 (1938).
7"[T]he insurance cases form a class by themselves, and but little reference is made
in them to the general law of contracts." 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston
and Thompson 1936) § 369, p. 1079.8By the great weight of authority, a life insurance beneficiary's right is indefeasible
unless the reservation of the power to change the beneficiary is expressly included in
the policy. Goldman v. Moses, 287 Mass. 393, 191 N. E. 873 (1934); Davis v. Modern
Industrial Bank, 279 N. Y. 405, 18 N. E. (2d) 639 (1939), noted (1939) 24 CORNELL
L. Q. 608; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 147; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 396.9See supra note 6. "[The tentative] trust in substance appears to be testamentary.
It is clear that a similar trust of property other than savings bank deposits would be
invalid." 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 58.3, p. 360.10224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639, 2 A. L. R. 1187, 1193 (1918).
'
1 The right vests without assent subject to the possibility of rejection. Rogers v.
Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589 (1875) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thomp-
son 1936) § 349; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 137.1 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 142, and WHITESIDE, NEW YORK ANNOTATIONS
(1933) at § 142. Cf. cases supra note 8.
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the original contract was expressly reserved, though that agreement was
itself subject to certain conditions, i.e., the mortgagee's death'3 prior to
March 7, 1940, with the debt unpaid.14
Although the court's cavalier treatment of Seaver v. Ransom'5 appears at
first blush to suggest a limitation on the development of the donee beneficiary
doctrine in New York by refusing to apply it to this type of case, actually
the court by dictum reaffirmed the doctrine and adopted the Restatement
view that the duty of the promisor to a donee beneficiary cannot be released
or discharged by the promisee.16 Upon the facts of the instant case, the
court merely declined to hold that any rights whatever were intended to or
did vest in the plaintiffs. The court's added dictum that all three parties
must be alive 7 tends to mislead if understood to mean that all parties must
be alive at the time of making of the contract, since it is well recognized
that the donee beneficiary may be unidentified at the time the contract
is made.'8
Had the draftsman of the extension agreement made it in terms irrev-
ocable, a contrary result would have been reached.19 Similarly, validity
through compliance with the Statute of Wills could have been obtained by
adding to the agreement the phrase "as provided in my last will and testa-
ment" and to the will a corresponding provision.2 0
The decision in the instant case may be supported in view of the practical
considerations involved. First, there is a strong public interest, jealously
guarded by the courts, in mobilizing property for taxing purposes under
the Statute of Wills of a given jurisdiction. The amount here involved was
small ;21 but allowed in this case, the method might open the way to a mode
of evasion in similar situations involving much larger amounts. More im-
portant is the havoc that a contrary holding might wreak in the real estate
13 An agreement is not testamentary merely, because death of one of the parties is
a condition precedent to its enforcement. Univ. of S. Calif. v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App.
39, 283 Pac. 949 (1930) ; Miller v. McClune, 88 Pa. Super. Ct. 128 (1926) ; Gostina
v. Whitham, 148 Wash. 72, Z68 Pac. 132 (1928); Sheldon v. Blackman, 188 Wis. 4,
205 N. W. 486 (1925).
'
4The validity of the beneficiary's right is predicated upon the validity of the con-
tract from which it is derived. Alexander v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 233 N. Y. 300,
135 N. E. 509 (1922); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 140.
'
5The two cases upon which the court principally relied [Townsend v. Rackham,
143 N. Y. 516, 38 N. E. 731 (1894); Priester v. Hohloch, 70 App. Div. 256, 75 N. Y.
Supp. 405 (3d Dep't 1902)] were decided when New York did not recognize the donee
beneficiary of a third party contract. However, on the authority of Seaver v. Ransom,
supra note 10, the two earlier cases well might have gone the other way.
10281 N. Y. at 410. RESTATEMFENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 142.
17281 N. Y. at 410.
18RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 139. In speaking of donee beneficiary contracts
as "executed contracts" [281 N. Y. at 410], the court not only uses confusing terminology
but also seems guilty of begging the question.
'9281 N. Y. at 410.2 0A conveyed land to B subject to payment by B to C of $1500 within one year after
A's decease, "as provided in my [A's] last will and testament." Later, A gave B
another deed, purporting to extinguish the encumbrance; but A reaffirmed her original
intention in her will. Held, C's rights are indefeasible and were not affected by
the subsequent deed. Logan v. Glass, 136 Pa. Super. Ct. 220, 7 AtI. 116 (1939).2 1The principal indebtedness was $3000.
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field. The mortgagor who-perhaps unaware of possible complications-
promises to pay collateral heirs if the promisee dies might well encounter
perplexing problems in attempting to locate such heirs, for heirs, like hares,
have a way of multiplying and scattering in a most confusing manner.
Difficulty in locating all proper payees would act as a drag on land trans-
actions because of the delay involved, while complete inability to locate them
would render the property less salable due to the resultant cloud on title.
Similar considerations apply to foreclosure actions and the procedural diffi-
culties attached thereto. Recognition, both explicit and implicit, of these
factors moved the court to insist upon adherence to the legislative require-
ments for transmission by testamentary device. Therefore, it may be well
that the court did not extend the third party beneficiary doctrine to this
precise situation. The way, however, seems still open for its application
to similar situations in which the practical considerations do not weigh soheavily. John Wesley Reed
Damages: Damages in tort for deceit.-The efforts of the courts to
formulate a rule of damages in fraud and deceit capable of precise appli-
cation has led to a diversity of opinion. This diversity has spread to an
equal degree among text writers and professors so that nothing is settled as
the just law.1 This paper will limit itself to a discussion of the diversity
of opinion as to what is the proper measure of damages in tort actions
wherein fraud has induced the sale of real property.
The recent case of Selman et ux. v. Shirley et al., 161 Ore. 613, 91 P. (2d)
312 (1939), is a good example to use in such a discussion. There the plain-
tiff entered into a written contract to purchase, for $2000, a 160-acre ranch
from the defendant. A substantial down payment was made, but after
plaintiff failed to continue payment, defendant sought to eject him. Plaintiff,
to prevent this, sued defendant for damages for fraud and deceit. He
claimed that he was induced to buy because of certain false representa-
tions, among which was the defendant's representation that the stumpage on
the land amounted to at least 4000 cords of wood whereas the total was
actually only 200 cords.2 The trial court found that the fair market value
of the land actually was equal to the purchase price and concluded that the
plaintiff had suffered no damage. The Supreme Court of Oregon,3 how-
ever, awarded the plaintiff damages to the extent of the value of 3800 cords.4
The original sale price was $2000, of which $750 had been paid down. Since
the plaintiff was allowed $.50 per cord for the difference between the repre-
IThis point is very well put in the opening paragraph of Hannegan, The Measure of
Damages it Tort for Deceit (1938) 18 B. U. L. Rzv. 681.
21t is interesting to note that the facts show that plaintiff inspected the premises
during a heavy rain and had no knowledge or experience in judging timber or lands.
3A prior appeal on this case is 161 Ore. 582, 85 P. (2d) 384 (1938), wherein the
court held as the majority did in this case at bar.
4There was also an adjustment for the amount due the defendant on the purchase
of the land.
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sented 4000 cords and the actual 200, which sum amounted to $1900, the
court's decree enabled plaintiff to acquire the 160 acres for $100. This
is an application of what is commonly called the "loss-of-bargain," rule.
However, the dissent in a very forceful argument applied the "out-of-
pocket" rule and thus would have denied plaintiff any recovery.
The "out-of-pocket" rule is supported by the Supreme Court of the United
States,5 the courts of England" and a few American states, 7 and the Re-
statement of Torts.8 The "loss-of-bargain" view is supported by the courts
of the great majority of our states.9 Under the "out-of-pocket" rule the
measure of damages is the actual loss sustained as a legal result of the
fraud which in the case of the purchase of property will ordinarily be the
difference between the price paid by the plaintiff and the actual value of
the property.10 The supporters of this view claim that the plaintiff's recovery
should, in all equity, be based on what he lost by reason of the falsity. They
say that the function of tort damages is to make up for the loss of some-
thing, which plaintiff did have and has lost, by giving him back the amount
he paid less the value of what he received. This view gives smaller verdicts as
it gives to the defrauded party only the amount which he is out of pocket.
It is easy of application as it sets up a simple, definite standard.
The majority "loss-of-bargain" rule measures the damages of the de-
5Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U. S. 116, 21 Sup. Ct. 34 (1900) ; Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S.
125, 10 Sup.. Ct. 39 (1889); Chandler v. Andrews, 192 Fed. 543, 113 C. C. A. 15
(C. C. A. 2d 1911); see Towle v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 26 F. (2d) 209, 212
(C. C. A. 8th 1928).6Peek v. Derry, L. R. Ch. Div. 541 (1887).7Ark., Minn., N. Y., Ore., Pa.; see note (1938) 57 A. L. R. 1147 for a complete state
by state discussion.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144
(1919) repudiated the view of "loss-of-benefit" and declared for the "out-of-pocket"
view. It is said that Reno v. Bull has been qualified by Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co.,
247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928). MCCORMicK, DAMAGES (1935) 450, n. 14, states
this latter case indicates a willingness in New York to relax the strictness of the "actual
loss" measure of damages in cases where it appears inadequate to accomplish justice.
8 RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1938) §§ 549, 525.
9Phillips v. Malone, 223 Ala. 381, 136 So. 793 (1931) ; Porter v. Hilton, 214 Cal. 705,
7 P. (2d) 301 (1931) ; Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618 (1887) ; Bruns-
wick v. Demond, 35 Ga. App. 668, 134 S. E. 350 (1927); Hicks v. Dumes, 187 Ill.
164, 58 N. E. 252 (1900) ; Williamson v. Woten, 132 Ind. 202, 31 N. E. 791 (1892);
Perry Co. v. Gould, 214 Iowa 893, 241 N. W. 666 (1932); Sheffer v. Rudnick, 291
Mass. 205, 196 N. E. 864 (1935) ; Hafner v. Stuart Land Co., 246 Mich. 465, 224 N. W.
630 (1929) ; Walfersberger v. Miller, 327 Mo. 1150, 39 S. W. (2d) 758 (1931) ; Long
v. Freeman, 228 Mo. App. 1002, 69 S. W. (2d) 973 (1934); Beasley v. Swenton, 46
S. C. 4Z6, 24 S. E. 313 (1896) ; Kerr v. Stauffer, 59 S.'D. 83, 238 N. W. 156 (1931) ;
McDonald v. McNull, 92 Vt. 356, 104 Atl. 337 (1918) ; Stout v. Marten, 87 W. Va.
1, 104 S. E. 157 (1920).10Roosevelt v. Mo. Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 8th 1935); McDonough v.
Williams, 77 Ark. 261, 92 S. W. 783 (1905); Keeney v. Angell, 92 Colo. 203, 19 P.(2d) 215 (1935) ; Cramer v. Overfield, 115 Kan. 586, 223 Pac. 1100 (1924) ; McGuffen
v. Smith, 215 Ky. 606, 289 S. W. 884 (1926); Heidigger v. Burg, 137 Minn. 53, 162
N. W. 889 (1917); Mitchell v. Bassett, 99 N. J. L. 110, 123 Atl. 761 (1924);
Graetz v. Smith, 125 Misc. 836, 211 N. Y. Supp. 577 (Sup. Ct. 1924) ; Zobrist v. Estes, 65
Ore. 573, 133 Pac. 644 (1912) ; Curtis v. Buzard, 254 Pa. 61, 98 Atl. 777 (1916) ; BOHLEN,
CASES ON TORTS (3d ed. 1926) 751; HARPER, TORTS (1933) 496; McCoRmicK, DAMAGES
(1935) 448 et seq.
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
frauded vendee as the difference between the actual value of the property
purchased and the value which it would have had if the representation had
been true." Some authorities favor this view because, they say, in an action
of tort for a false warranty the plaintiff recovers the warranted value; a
defendant in deceit is not merely a fraudulent person, he is also a warrantor
of the truth of his statements, so the additional element of deceit cannot
deprive the injured person of the rights which would be his if this element
were lacking.12 The supporters of this view also say that the "out-of-
pocket" rule is favorable to the fraudulent person because he cannot lose
anything by his fraud, while he stands'a chance of making a profit if he is
not caught. The majority rule protects the plaintiff against loss caused
by the deceit and protects his interests in making an advantageous bargain.
1 3
In few states have the courts applied any one of the theories with entire
consistency. The courts will more often make the damages dependent upon
the character of the misrepresentation rather than upon either theory.14  So
where the misrepresentations were made as to the existence of improvements
on a parcel of land, recovery was limited to the cost of putting the improve-
ments on the land.' 5 Where the price paid was made up of a specific rate
per unit of land, or where the price was paid for the whole tract, but the
various units were of equal value, the damages have been measured by multi-
plying the rate paid or value per unit by the number of units by which the
tract of land was deficient.16
One court, where there was considerable difference between the actual
value and the represented value, placed the damages "as the difference be-
tween the purchase price and a sum of money which bears the same pro-
portion to the purchase price as the actual value of the land bears to the
value there'of if it had been as represented." 17  Another court, while com-
mitted to the majority view, rejected it in favor of the "out-of-pocket" view
where the damages as measured by the latter were more just in the par-
ticular case.
1 8
-"Supra note 9.
125 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) §§ 1391 et seq.
13Spreckels v. Gorrill, 152 Cal. 383, 92 Pac. 1011 (1907) ; Chapman v. Bible, 171
Mich. 663, 137 N. W. 533 (1912); Johnson v. Meyers, 91 Ore. 179, 177 Pac. 631
(1919); Webb v. Emerson-Brantenghen Co., 227, S. W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
Also see supra note 9.
14M cCORMicK, DAMAGES (1935) 452.
15Dinwiddie v. Stone, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 584, 52 S. W. 814 (1899); Shane v. Jacobson,
136 Minn. 386, 162 N. W. 472 (1917).
16Tyler v. Anderson, 106 Ind. 185, 6 N. E. 600 (1886); Purdy v. Underwood, 87
Ore. 56, 169 Pac. 536 (1918) ; Cawston v. Sturgis, 29 Ore. 331, 43 Pac. 656 (1896).
The courts which apply the "loss-of-bargain" view for fraud in value, quality, or
condition are less strict where the misrepresentations go to the quantity or boundaries
of the land. So the measure of damages is reached by deducting from the purchase
price a sum of money to be measured by the relative value of a tract included within
the false boundary. Also where the misrepresentation relates to titles or encumbrances
the courts usually allow the amount paid for the property where the title is defective,
and where encumbered they allow the amount necessary to discharge the encumbrance.
See (1912) 38 L. IL A. (N.s.) 465; (1907) 8 L. R. A. (N.s.) 804; McCoRmIcN,
DAMAGES (1935) 452.
17Pruitt v. Jones, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 86, 36 S. W. 502 (1896).
IsHines v. Brode, 168 Cal. 507, 511, 143 Pac. 729 (1914).
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A commendable decision was reached by a California court 9 when it
realized that the "loss-of-bargain" rule was extreme, and decided to apply
it only in clear cases, and not where the result would be too hard on the
defendant. The court took the equities of the case into consideration and
decided against the majority view. This appears to be a proper handling
of the case. The courts should always weigh the equities, e.g., the price
paid by the plaintiff, the misrepresentations of defendant as being negligent
or fraudulent, and the negligence of plaintiff.
In the case at bar the plaintiff received land worth $2000, and he agreed
to pay that amount for it. However, he did not receive what he expected
in the land so he is given the full benefit of his agreement by application
of the "loss-of-bargain" view. The "out-of-pocket" rule would give plain-
tiff no recovery since he was not damaged, having received land equal in
value to the money he was to pay for it. There can be no recovery unless
it appears that the property was worth less than he paid for it. The weak-
ness in this view is that it does not take into consideration what the land
is worth from the point of view of the buyer but rather it looks only at
what the land is worth from the viewpoint of the public.
The equities are also important. The principal case furnishes a good
example of how the judges can view a case in entirely different lights by
looking at different equities. The majority of the court was evidently much
impressed by the evidence that the defendant was guilty of fraud so they
adopted the "loss-of-bargain" rule, apparently as a good means to punish
him. On the other hand, the minority thought the defendant's deceit was far
outweighed by plaintiff's lack of care in his reliance ;20 feeling that plaintiff
deserved no relief, they applied the "out-of-pocket" rule.
Both views have a place in the ascertainment of damages. Neither should
be used to the exclusion of the other.2' Generally, the "out-of-pocket" view
would seeSn to be a more equitable rule. But where the court considers the
moral culpability of the defendant and the definiteness of the representations,
and where the represented value is readily ascertainable, the "loss-of-bargain"
rule should be applied.22 There should be an attempt to avoid making the
'
9Williams v. Spazier, 134 Cal. App. 340, 21 P. (2d) 470 (1933).2 OPrincipal case at p. 329: "It is difficult to understand how anyone, after inspection,
could have been deceived about logged-off land. It would seem that the black stumps
would speak for themselves. It is also difficult to understand why the Selmans con-
tinued to make payments after learning, in August 1933, of the shortage of wood and
their alleged consequent damages." But see note 2 supra.
And at p. 330: "The equities of the case are not entirely with the plaintiffs."
The minority does not make this the sole basis of the opinion: "Let it be understood
that this opinion is bottomed in the legal proposition that the 'benefit of the bargain'
rule does not apply to the facts in this case. We have adverted to these features of the
case only to refute the idea of a gross miscarriage of justice in the event the decree of
the lower court is sustained."2 1 It is interesting to note that California and Texas have passed statutes requiring
the application of opposed rules. California applies the "out-of-pocket" rule in all
cases in the purchase, sale, or exchange of property. CAL. GEN. LAWs (Deering Supp.,
1935) § 3343, p. 143. Texas applies the "loss-of-bargain" rule in cases involving trans-
actions in real estate or in stock of corporations. TEx. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) tit. 66,
art. 4004, p. 792.2 2 McCoRmicx, DAMAGES (1935) ch. 18, § 121.
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plaintiff suffer in his bargain-yet at the same time the defendant should
not be too harshly dealt with unless it be an obvious case of intentional
misleading.
Emanuel P. Snyder
Evidence: Proper disclosure during trial that defendant is insured.&-
Plaintiff sued for damages to his automobile alleged to have been caused by
the negligence of Dennis Payne, an employee of defendknt, in driving the
defendant's truck against the plaintiff's car. Defendant on direct examina-
tion testified that plaintiff visited defendant and asked to see Payne, explain-
ing that he wanted to discuss the accident with him. Defendant said he told
plaintiff that Payne would be in directly, and added, "That was all that was
said." On cross-examination, defendant testified that nothing was said about
his paying for the damage. The witness was then asked, "Didn't you tell
him you had insurance, and it was up to them to fix it up ?" Upon objection
by the defense, the court refused to allow the witness to answer. The Georgia
Court of Appeals held that it was error to sustain the objection. The ques-
tion was competent, for an affirmative answer would have indicated that
the defendant did not deny, but impliedly admitted, liability for the damage.
Also, an affirmative answer would have discredited the defendant as a
witness by contradicting his previous testimony that "that was all that was
said." Owens v. Shugart, 61 Ga. App. 177, 6 S. E. (2d) 121 "(1939).
The courts uniformly hold that it is error to permit the plaintiff to dis-
close, as an independent fact, that the defendant is insured.' Juries are
prejudiced against insurance companies and, upon learning that the defend-
ant is insured, are less likely to consider the merits of the case in their verdict
and award of damages. 2  Sporadic cases urge that one who is insured is
freed of restraint induced by the pecuniary responsibility for his acts. Thus,
it is said, the fact of insurance, although incidentally prejudicial, is relevant,
and should be submitted to the jury for consideration on the question of care
in the particular case 3  However, no reasonable inference about the exer-
cise of care can be drawn from defendant's being insured; that a man is
likely to be more careless if insured is at most the merest guess.4 Experi-
ence indicates that the responsible person takes out insurance. The irrespon-
sible may not.5 One who is insured may have a lesser motive for carefulness,
but the question of motive is irrelevant in a negligence case. The issue is
For collection of authorities, see note (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1418. The propriety of
questions on voir dire concerning juror's connection with insurance companies is beyond
the scope of this note. See note (1934) 20 CORNELL L. Q. 110.2Holman v. Cole, 242 Mich. 402, 218 N. W. 795 (1928).
3Jessup v. Davis, 115 Neb. 1, 211 N. W. 190 (1926), 56 A. L. R. 1403, 1418 (1928),
without precedent, adopted this view. Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., 130 Neb. 576, 265
N. W. 726 (1936), repudiated this aberration.' See (1936) 15 NEB. L. BULL. 185; Sims
v. Martin, 33 Ga. App. 486, 126 S. E. 872 (1925) (dictum, not followed and impliedly
rejected by the court in the principal case).4Brown v. Walter, 62 F. (2d) 798, 800 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
GLanbam v. Bond, 157 Va. 167, 160 S. E. 89 (1931).
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whether or not due care was exercised, regardless of what brought it about.6
A New Jersey case takes the singular view that upon one's taking out
insurance he would naturally be of more careless disposition; but negligent
disposition, like criminal disposition, although relevant and logically per-
suasive, confuses the issue and is too prejudicial to be admitted.7
The rule that it is error to disclose that the defendant is insured has,
however, a broad qualification: If the fact of insurance tends to prove some
material issue, or is necessarily involved in some evidence which bears upon
a material issue, it will not be excluded on the ground that it may tend to
prejudice the defendant. The theory is that evidence is admissible if it
tends to prove one issue, even though it is not competent to prove, and is
prejudicial upon, another issue."
The circumstances may indicate that defendant's carrying insurance did
cause him to act negligently. Where a plaintiff who was injured while
riding in defendant's automobile admonished him to drive more carefully or
some one would be killed, defendant's answer, "Don't worry, I carry insur-
ance for that," is competent evidence, bearing directly upon his negligence. 9
Facts tending to impeach a witness or discredit evidence may generally be
established even though they disclose that the defendant is insured. For
instance, it can be shown that a civil engineer called by defendant made his
measurements at the scene of the accident at the direction of the insurance
company ;1o that a lawyer testifying to his investigation of the accident rep-
resented the insurance company ;11 that a doctor appearing for the defendant
examined the plaintiff at the request of, and expects to be paid by, the insur-
ance company ;12 that photographs introduced in evidence were taken by an
agent of the insurance company ;13 that written statements used to show prior
contradictory statements of plaintiff's witness were taken down by a repre-
6Sawyer v. Arnold Shoe Co., 90 Me. 369, 38 AtI. 333 (1897); Edwards v. Laurel
Branch Coal Co., 133 Va. 534, 114 S. E. 108 (1922); Walters v. Appalachian Power
Co., 75 W. Va. 676, 84 S. E. 617 (1915).
7Sutton v. Bell, 79 N. J. L. 507, 77 Atl. 42 (1910).
SGarvey v. Ladd, 266 S. W. 727 (Kan. 1924). Sims v. Martin, supra note 3, and
Tanner v. Smith, 97 Mont. 229, 33 P. (2d) 547 (1934), in each of which there was
another ground for the admissibility of the reference to insurance, indicate that, if made
immediately after the accident, it is competent as part of the res. gestae. However, by
the rule of res gestae, evidence otherwise incompetent is admissible only if relevant.
Since the fact of insurance, without more, bears upon no issue, the position is not well
taken. Lanham v. Bond, supra note 5.9Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80 N. H. 557, 119 Atl. 705 (1923).
'OMoniz v. Bettincourt, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 718, 76 P. (2d) 535 (1938).
IlRobinson v. Leonard, 100 Vt. 1, 134 Atl. 706 (1926) ; Lander v. Shannon, 148 Wash.
193, 268 Pac. 145 (1928).
12Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely, 24 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 5th 1928) ; Curtis v.
Ficken, 52 Idaho 426, 16 P. (2d) 977 (1932) ; Miss. Ice & Utilities Co. v. Pearce, 161
Miss. 252, 134 So. 164 (1931); Di Tomasso v. Syracuse Univ., 218 N. Y. 640, 112
N. E. 1057, aff'd w. o. op., 172 App. Div. 34, 158 N. Y. Supp. 175 (4th Dep't 1916);
but see Southland Greyhound Lines v. Cotten, 126 Tex. 596, 91 S. V. (2d) 326 (1936),
saying at page 603, "This has been too often held improper to require citation of
authority."
1sHodge v. Weinstock, Lubin & Co., 109 Cal. App. 393, 293 Pac. 80 (1930).
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sentative of the insurance company ;14 that a general release was obtained by
fraudulent representations of the insurance company's agents.' 5 A fairly
recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that the plaintiff
may not show that a witness testifying that the defendant was not negligent
had settled with the defendant's insurance company claims he pressed against
defendant for injuries arising out of the same accident. 16 The dissent in the
case seems more sound and in line with the prior decisions of the court.
Admission of the evidence would discredit the witness by showing either that
he pressed claims in bad faith or was testifying falsely.
The argument that a defendant's testimony is discredited by showing that
he is insured is specious.1 7 By establishing that the defendant is insured
against an adverse verdict, it is shown that he is not pecuniarily interested
in the outcome. So plaintiff offers, in effect, to 'strengthen the credibility
of an adverse witness.'8
An admission which discloses that the defendant is insured is not thereby
rendered incompetent. For instance, it can be shown that a dentist who
denies he injured the plaintiff had notified his insurance company that he
dislocated the plaintiff's jaw; :9 that defendant had insured the truck which
'
4 Mideastern Contracting Corp. v. O'Toole, 55 F. (2d) 909 (C. C. A. 2d 1932) ; Cer-
villo v. Manhattan Oil Co., 226 Mo. App. 1090, 49 S. V. (2d) 183 (1932); Booth v.
Coldiron, 55 Ohio App. 144, 9 N. E. (2d) 161 (1936).
15Arizona Cotten Oil Co. v. Thompson, 30 Ariz. 204, 245 Pac. 673 (1926) ; Parker v.
Norton, 143 Ore. 165, 21 P. (2d) 790 (1933). See also Dermer v. Pistoresi, 109 Cal.
App. 310, 293 Pac. 78 (1930) (not improper to ask if surprise story of witness was not
suggested by the agent of the insurance company) ; Fletcher v. Saunders, 132 Ore. 67,
284 Pac. 276 (1930) (proper to show that witness visited the scene of the accident at
the suggestion of the insurance company.). Brown v. Walter, supra note 4, held it
was error to ask the defendant if he had not been interviewed by the insurance agent,
since there was no attempt to establish any contradiction between what he said to the
agent and what he said on the stand.
16 Kaplan v. Loev, 327 Pa. 465, 194 Atl. 653 (1937), noted (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 447.
'
7 New Jersey, it seems, stands alone in permitting the plaintiff on cross-examination
to ask the defendant if he is insured. Brant v. Asarnow, 7 N. J. Misc. 803, 147 Atl.
233 (1929), aff'd w. o. op., 106 N. J. L. 559, 150 Atl. 917 (1930). The court decided
the case without discussion upon the authority of Day v. Donohue, 62 N. J. L. 380
41 Atl. 934 (1898), wherein, on page 383, the court stated the issue to be ". . . whether
a party who is testifying in his own defense, apparently may not be asked whether
it is really in his own defense that he is testifying. In other words, whether, if the
truth were known about his relation to the suit as a party, it might not place his testi-
mony as a witness in a different light." It was held that it would. The court in the Brant
case did not cite Sutton v. Bell, supra note 7, which said, at page 511, "The Day case had
no special application to the matter of insurance, and decided nothing as to the admissi-
bility of such matter upon the merits, or for the purpose of discrediting the witness or
affecting his credibility." The court asserted that the Day case rested upon special facts,
'but the language of the majority of the Day court, and the dissent, not at all adverting to
the peculiar facts, repel this conclusion. The court in the Brant case, it seems, impliedly
rejects the Sutton court's construction of the Day case, and the state returns to its
original policy.
18Beardsley v. Ewing, 50 N. D. 373, 168 N. W. 791 (1918) ; Iverson v. McDonnell,
36 Wash. 73, 78 Pac. 202 (1904) ; 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 969.
19Hill v. Jackson, 272 S. W. 105 (Mo. App. 1925), held it was error to ask defendant
if he had not so reported to the insurance company, because counsel for plaintiff knew
that he had not, the sole purpose of the question being to inform the jury that defendant
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he denies he owns ;20 that defendant-employer carries indemnity insurance
for the acts of one who he claims is employed by an independent contractor..
2 1
One who is insured generally discloses this to the injured party. Where
the reference to insurance is an integral part of the admission, the entire
statement is admissible.2 2 Most courts hold that the reference to insurance
must be omitted if it can be done without substantially impairing the natural
force of the admission.23 Some courts maintain a less tenable position and
permit the reference to insurance, even though it is separable from the ad-
mission, if it tends to corroborate plaintiff's testimony that defendant
admitted liability.2 4  A bare unsupported allegation that the defendant ad-
mitted liability might appear extremely unreasonable, and, it is said, the
plaintiff may make it more credible by showing that in connection therewith
the defendant also said he was insured. One who is insured would be more
likely to acknowledge a fault. It seems, however, that the prejudicial effect
of the reference to insurance would outweigh its corroborative value. Since
the competency of this evidence is based upon its corroborative value, it
seems that logically these courts should also hold that it is permissible to
support an alleged admission by showing that the defendant is insured, even
though he made no reference to insurance in his admission; it is the fact of
insurance which is corroborative. This apparently is not considered in
the cases.
Often it is alleged that the defendant, although not expressly admitting
was insured. If counsel were not certain, and could not establish that he had grounds to
believe a report had been made, fair dealing requires that the question first be asked
outside of the hearing of the jury. In Grant v. Nat'l Ry. Spring Co., 100 App. Div.
234, 237, 91 N. Y. Supp. 805 (4th Dep't 1905), it is said: "The asking of a questidn
clearly incompetent, and not for the purpose of eliciting any material evidence, but with
the ulterior design of disclosing the fact that an insurance company is interested in the
litigation, is condemned. It is only when the question is incompetent and immaterial,
however, that the motive of counsel is to be considered."
2 0 Paepke v. Stadelman, 222 Mo. App. 346, 300 S. W. 845 (1927) ; Harper v. Highway
Motor Freight Lines, 89 S. W. (2d) 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).2 1Moore-Handley Hardware Co. v. Williams, 189 So. 757 (Ala. 1939); Curcic v.
Nelson Display Co., 19 Cal. App. 46, 64 P. (2d) 1153 (1937); Biggans v. Wagner,
60 S. D. 581, 245 N. W. 385 (1932).2 2Reid v. Owens, 93 P. (2d) 680 (Utah 1939). The theory of a suit against the
father for injuries allegedly caused by the negligent driving of his automobile by his
son was that the father permitted him to use the car knowing he was a careless driver.
The reference by the father to his insurance in the following statement made soon after
the accident was held to be "freighted with admission" and competent: "My boy is care-
less and he drives too fast and it worries us. We have taken out insurance to protect
him." Accord, Flieg v. Levy, 148 App. Div. 781, 133 N. Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dep't 1912),
aff'd w. o. op., 208 N. Y. 564, 101 N. E. 1102 (1913). See infra note 28.
231n Anderson v. Mothershead, 19 Cal. App. 97, 64 P. (2d) 995 (1937), the follow-
ing reference to insurance was separable: ". . . he mumbled something about he couldn't
help his actions, and that he did not see the car, and said he was sorry, but he couldn't
help it, but he says, 'I have got full coverage'." Accord, Kuhn v. Kjose, 216 Iowa 36,
248 N. W. 230 (1933). In McCurdy v. Flibotte, 83 N. H. 143, 145, 139 Atl. 367
(1927), the court said: "No strict rule for the exercise of the court's discretion in such
respect can be laid down beyond the general rule of the legal policy to exclude evi-
dence of the insurance 'wherever it is practicable to do so'."2 4 Garvey v. Ladd, supra note 8.
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that he was at fault, "said he had full coverage," 25 or "said he was covered
with insurance, and he would see the insurance company about it,"26 or "said
he was very sorry of course, and told me to go ahead and do all I could for
the boy; to let no money stand in the way; he was fully insured for it; he
would take care of it." 2 7 These statements have been held inadmissible. In
the principal case the court held that had the defendant answered the
inquiry about paying for the damage with the statement that "he had
insurance and it was up to them to fix it up," he would have impliedly
admitted liability for the damage. The New York Court of Appeals has
held it error to admit the testimony of plaintiff's witness that, upon asking
the defendant what he intended to do about the accident, he replied, "Nothing,
we hold insurance and you have to see the insurance. 12 8
The statements of the defendant in the principal case seem to be an ex-
pression of indifference about liability, rather than an admission of fault.2 9
We impute to a person a duty to deny fault when any other reaction on his
part would be wholly unnatural.30 The defendant here is pecuniarily dis-
interested, and it is understandable that he should consider it pointless to
provoke a dispute by denying that his employee was negligent. His attitude
might be that he has no objections to the injured party's getting something
from the insurance company, even though there has been no legal wrong.
When one refers another to his insurance company, or indicates that his
insurance company will pay, he may merely be giving expression to the wide-
spread belief that the insurance company is liable for all damage regardless
of who is at fault.3 1 At least the statement is open to various constructions,
25Schlenker v. Egloff, 24 P. (2d) 224 (Cal. 1933).2 0 Van Dyke v. Knoll, 262 Mich. 644, 247 N. W. 768 (1933).27Whitman v. Carver, 337 Mo. 1247, 88 S. W. (2d) 885 (1935).28Rodzborski v. American Sugar Refining Co., 210 N. Y. 262, 104 N. E. 616 (1912)
(without, however, discussing its incompetency as an admission). It is submitted that
the la~v of New York is in accord with the rules indicated in this note. Broad state-
ments by the courts have confused the problem, but the holdings of the Court of
Appeals are consistent. Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N. Y. 479, 95 N. E. 10 (1909)
(held error for plaintiff to elicit from his witness that in an interview with the general
superintendent of the defendant company two attorneys were present who were intro-
duced as representing an insurance company) ; Akin v. Lee, 206 N. Y. 20, 99 N. E. 85
(1912) (held error to ask defendant: "You told Mr. Akin that you were insured against
such accidents, didn't you?") ; Flieg v. Levy, supra note 22 (held that a reference to in-
surance in an admission of ownership was competent) ; Di Tomasso v. Syracuse Univ.,
supra note 12 (upon certified question, held not improper to show that doctor for defend-
ant examined the plaintiff at the request of the insurance company). But cf. Toombs v.
Texas Oil Co., 145 Misc. 762, 260 N. Y. Supp. 773 (City Court, Bronx County, 1932),
which, without citing the Di Tonmasso case, held it was error to show that a doctor called
by defendant was asked to appear at the trial by the insurance company. Defendant was
not permitted to disclose the doctor's relations with the insurance company. See also
Tincknell v. Ketchum, 78 Misc. 419, 139 N. Y. Supp. 620 (Sup. Ct., Cayuga County,
1912), which held that an admission containing a reference to an insurance company
was incompetent, relying upon a dictum in Manigold v. Black River Traction Co., 81
App. Div. 381, 80 N. Y. Supp. 861 (4th Dep't 1903), that a reference to insurance is not
competent under any circumstances.2 9 McCurdy v. Flibotte, supra note 23; Duke v. Parker, 125 S. C. 442, 118 S. E.
802 (1923).
304 WIGmORE, EViDENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 1060.
3 1Kuhn v. Kjose, supra note 23.
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and this prejudicial information should not be given to the jury on the basis
of conjecture.
It is generally competent to show that the testimony of a witness is false.
Clearly an acknowledgment by the defendant that he did refer the' plaintiff
to his insurance company would contradict his testimony that nothing else
was said. However, where questions are embarrassing or prejudicial and
their evidentiary value slight, the right of cross-examination may be subject
to the discretion of the trial court.8 2 Plaintiff, in a case in a Federal District
Court, was prevented from putting into evidence a written statement the
defendant's witness made to an insurance agent. The statement contained
nothing contradictory to his testimony, but at the bottom was the attestation
that the witness read the paper before signing, which plaintiff demonstrated
was not true. The court held that the evidence had only the slightest possi-
ble importance in impeaching him and, because of its prejudicial effect, Was
inadmissible.33 It has been said that "the fact of insurance may incidentally
and unavoidably appear. But even this should not be permitted on slight or
for specious reasons."8 4  It is submitted that the ruling of the trial court
in the principal case should have been upheld.
An examination of the cases indicates that it is the unusual situation
which does not afford an opportunity legitimately to inform the jury during
trial that the defendant is insured.
Bernard R. Rapoport
Libel: Liability for transmission of defamatory telegraph message:
Exception to Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.-In O'Brien v. Western Union
Telegraph Company, 113 P. (2d) 539 (C. C. A. 1st 1940), it was held proper
for a trial judge to refuse to rule that a telegraph company was, as a matter
of law, not privileged in transmitting a message containing "obviously de-
famatory statements." In reaching this decision the court stated that it was
not bound by the common law or the statutes either of Massachusetts,
where the message originated, or of Michigan, where it was delivered.
State and federal courts which have had occasion to pass on this question'
tend to follow the rule that a telegraph company is privileged in transmitting
telegrams defamatory on their face, if it does so in "good faith" and is not
guilty of negligence 2 Whether the company's operator was negligent in
32Gerry v. Neugebauer, 83 N. H. 23, 136 Atl. 751 (1927).33Brown v. Walter, supra note 4.
34Peichuck v. Magusiak, 82 N. H. 429, 135 Atl. 534 (1926).
1There have been very few decisions on this point. Smith, Liability of a Telegraph
Company for Transmnittq a Defamatory Message (1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 30, 369;
Flynn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 199 Wis. 124, 126, 225 N. W. 742 (1929). Neither
Massachusetts nor Michigan decisions directly in point have been found, hence the
propriety of the court's statement that it was not bound by the state law is a theoretical
problem. Cf. Rogers v. Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Mass., 265 Mass. 544, 164 N. E.
463 (1929) ; Bacon v. Michigan Central R. R., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N. W. 181 (1887). "2Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman, 149 Fed. 367, 371 (C. C. A. 5th 1906);
Nye v. Western Union Tel. Co., 104 Fed. 628, 631 (C. C. D. Minn. 1900) ; Paton v.
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accepting the message, and whether the transmission was in "good faith"
are questions to be left for the jury.3 In refusing to rule that as a matter of
law the defendant was not privileged to transmit the message in question,
O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Company followed all the authorities.
In holding that the court was not bound to follow either Massachusetts or
Michigan decisions,4 the O'Brien case attempts to exempt the problem pre-
sented from the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins5 which, reversing almost
a century of authority based on Swift v. Tyson,6 held that there was no
"federal common law" and that each federal court was to apply the law of
the state in which the cause of action accrued. Mr. Justice Brandeis, author
of this epochal opinion, stated the exceptions to the rule: "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the state."7 Under these exceptions it has
been held that the treaties with the Indians gave the Federal Government com-
plete rights over the tribes and in a suit by the United States to protect these
rights a federal court would not be bound by local law ;8 and in a dispute con-
cerning a collective labor agreement with an interstate railroad, the Railw/ay
Labor Act9 was held controlling and state law not applicable."0 The O'Brien
case is placed in this class of exceptions to the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tolnp-
kins by virtue of Sections 202, 206 and 207 of the Federal Communications
Act." Section 202 prohibits discrimination in rates or services; Sections 206
and 207 declare the carrier's liability for damages due to any unlawful act. On
the basis of these sections, the court in the O'Brie.n. case held that the extent of
the liability of a telegraph company for the transmission of a defamatory mes-
sage is to be decided without reference to state law. We must note, however,
that the language of Sections 202, 206 and 207 is almost identical with that of
corresponding Sections 3 (1), 8 and 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act,'2 and
therefore the interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act "will conclusively"
apply to the similar sections of the Communications Act.la The Supreme Court
of the United States interpreted these sections of the Interstate Commerce Act
Great Northwestern Tel. Co. of Canada, 141 Minn. 430, 170 N. W. 511 (1919) ; Peter-
son v. Western Union Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18, 23, 67 N. W. 646 (1896) ; Smith, mipra
note 1, at 384.3Bacon v. Michigan Central R. R., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N. W. 181 (1887) ; Peterson v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18, 67 N. W. 646 (1896). But cf. Nye v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 104 Fed. 628 (C. C. D. Minn. 1900) (held not enough evidence for thejury).4 See note 1 supra.
5304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).616 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
7304 U. S. 64, 78, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).8Board of Commissioners of Jackson County, Kansas v. United States, 308 U. S.
343, 60 Sup. Ct. 285 (1939).
944 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended 48 STAT. 1186 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 151
et seq. (Supp. 1939).
10 llinois Central R. R. v. Moore, 112 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th 1940).
1148 STAT. 1070 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §§ 202, 206, 207 (Supp. 1939).
1241 STAT. 479 (1920), as amended 49 STAT. 607 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3(1)
(1929); 24 STAT. 382 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 8 (1929); 24 STAT. 382 (1887), 49
U. S. C. A. § 9 (1929).
23 Stanley v. Western Union Tel. Co., 23 F. Supp. 674, 675 (S. D. Fla. 1938).
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as being applicable only to cases that were based on a failure to comply with
some provision of said Act.14  O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Corn-
pany involved no such failure-it concerned merely the definitive limits of a
particular tort. The Erie case involved the liability of a railroad for injuries
caused by negligent operation of its trains, and the court ignored these sec-
tions of the Interstate Commerce Act, declaring that state law was applicable.
It would seem, therefore, that the court was at least inconsistent in the
O'Brien case in relying on Sections 202, 206 and 207 of the Communications
Act as the basis for making the case an exception to the rule of Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins.
Cases interpreting the rule of the Erie case have made exceptions to the
rule other than the express "matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress." It has generally been held that Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins applied only to substantive law and not to procedural problems. 15
Questions of jurisdiction and venue are decided without regard to state law.16
Although what is "substance" and what is "procedure" has been the subject
of much argument, it is clear that the rules regarding the privilege to defame
involved in O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Company are matters
of substantive law.
To accept as authoritative the expression that state law was not to be fol-
lowed in the O'Brien case, when (a) the problem was clearly one of sub-
stantive law and (b) was not controlled by an Act of Congress, would be so
great a departure from the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins as to tend to
nullify it. Whether the expediency of having a uniform rule of liability for
an interstate company warrants such nullification is for the Supreme Court of
the United States to decide, keeping in mind such legislative intent as may
be discernible.
Jack L. Ratzkin
14Galveston, etc. R. R. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 490, 32 Sup. Ct. 205 (1912) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 21 Sup. Ct. 164 (1911).
"There was no need for Congress to declare as existent the fundamental right of
recovery for breach of contract or the perpetration of a tort, and it did not by such
Federal Communications Commission Act enact such a useless statute." Stanley v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 23 F. Supp. 674, 676 (S. D. Fla. 1938)".
15304 U. S. 64, 79-80, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938). See Gallagher et at. v. Carroll et a[.,
27 F. Supp. 568, 570 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). While the cases differ as to which problems
are "substantive" and which are "procedural," they all agree that Erie R. R. v. Tomp-
kins applies only to substantive problems. Hence, in Moore v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.,
28 F. Supp. 804 (W. D. Mo. 1939), it was held that presumptions and inferences from
the facts were procedural and the state rules not applicable. The question of the
burden of proof was held procedural. Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 10 F. (2d)
314 (C. C. A. 5th 1939). Contra: Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (Zd) 754 (C. C. A. 1st
1940) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. MacDonald, 96 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 9th
1938) ; Schopp v. Muller Dairies, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. N. Y. 1938). A federal
rule of damages was followed in disregard of the Erie doctrine in Twachtman v.
Connelly, 106 F. (2d) 501 (C. C. A. 6th 1939), criticized in note (1940) 6 U. op
PiTT. L. REv. 214; ef. Vaigneur v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 92 (E. D.
Tenn. 1940). For a thorough review of this question see Cook, "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YAL L. J. 333; Tunks, Categorization and
Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie R.R. v. Tompkins (1939) 34
ILL. L. Rav. 271.
'6Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 110 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 7th 1940);
Carby v. Greco et al., 31 F. Supp. 251 (W. D. Ky. 1940); Hedrick v. Canadian Pac.
R.R., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S. D. Ohio 1939).
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Municipal Corporations: Distinction between governmental and pro-
prietary functions: City's cooperation with W.P.A.-In Duren v. City
of Binghamton, 283 N. Y. 467, 28 N. E. (2d) 978 (1940), the city of Bing-
hamton was the lessee of a building, the lease specifying that the building
was to be used for relief purposes. The City's Department of Welfare used
the building as a warehouse and distribution depot for commodities, donated
by the federal government to the city, to be given to the poor. Thereafter,
the city permitted the Works Progress Administration to use, without charge,
part of the building as premises for a sewing project, the products to be
delivered to the Welfare Department. The city also provided light, heat,
insurance and certain materials for the project, while the federal agency
employed and paid the workers, all of whom as a requisite for employment
had to be on the city's relief rolls. The W.P.A. employees were invited to
use a corridor to reach the lavatory and drinking water facilities, which were
in the other part of the building. The sides of the corridor were lined with
barrels of flour, one of which, through the carelessness of an employee of
the city, struck the plaintiff as she was going to get a drink of water. The
Court of Appeals assumed for the purposes of the appeal that providing relief
for the indigent was a governmental duty, and the city might claim immunity
from liability for negligence of persons employed in carrying out that duty.
The court held that this immunity would not extend to the failure of the
city to perform its duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain in a safe
condition the corridor which it invited the W.P.A. workers to use.
The powers and duties of a municipal corporation fall into two categories:
governmental and proprietary.' In its governmental activities the municipal
corporation functions as an agent of the state for the benefit of the public
generally, and not to promote the, private interests of the local community,
for example, in matters pertaining to public health,2 education of the young,3
prevention of fire,4 prevention of crime5 and care of the poor.6  The city
in the performance of these public services is immune, unless made liable
by statute or charter, from private action for injuries resulting from the
wrongful acts of its agents. The proprietary activities of a municipality
provide for the local necessities and conveniences of the citizens, in which of
course the municipality has a private interest, for example, in the operation
and maintenance of water and light plants7 or a railroad belt,8 the construc-
tion and repair of sewers,9 and any business conducted for profit.10 The
'See 6 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1937) § 2792.2Benton v. Santa Monica, 106 Cal. App. 339, 289 Pac. 203 (1930) ; Foster v. Capital
Gas & Electric Co., 125 Kan. 574, 265 Pac. 81 (1928) ; 6 MCQUILLAN, Op. Cit. supra
note 1, § 2840.
8Titusville Iron Co. v. New York, 207 N. Y. 203, 100 N. E. 806 (1912).4Hall v. Jackson, 30 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 5th 1929).
5Dist. of Col. v. Totten, 55 App. D. C. 312, 5 F. (Zd) 374 (1925).
6Augustine v. Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928) ; Lefrois v. County of
Monroe, 162 N. Y. 563, 57 N. E. 185 (1900); Maxmilian v. Mayor of City of New
York, 62 N. Y. 161 (1875) ; 4 DiLLON, MUNICIPAL CorPoRATIoNs (5th ed. 1911) § 1661;
6 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2796, n. 61.7Davoust v. Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 84 Pac. 760 (1906).
SDavis v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 155 La. 504, 99 So. 419 (1923).9Baker & Co. v. Hollis, 169 Okla. 253, 36 P: (2d) 757 (1934).
100'Donnell v. N. Attleboro, 212 Mass. 243, 98 N. E. 1084 (1912).
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municipality in the performance of these proprietary functions is bound by
all the rules of law and procedure applicable to any other corporation or
individual engaged in like enterprise. These rules are elementary, but there
is much difficulty in applying them. The line of demarcation between pri-
vate and public activities is often very tenuous.
The doctrine exempting a municipal corporation from private action for
torts resulting from the performance of its governmental functions has been
criticized by eminent authority."- The arguments presented in favor of the
doctrine are: (1) the city in performing public services is'the agent of the
state, and partakes of the sovereign's immunity to private suit;12 (2) to
recognize these damage claims would deplete public funds and hamper neces-
sary governmental activities ;13 (3) city employees are the representatives of
the injured person as well as other taxpayers, and he is as much at fault
in failing to provide prudent city employees as any other taxpayer.14
It seems more just to permit these claims and spread the risk, the increased
taxation operating as a form of insurance. However, the rule is established
in New York by inveterate precedent, and for any modifications we must
look to the legislature.15 The legislature has in several instances abrogated
the common law and imposed liability on the city for the governmental acts
of its agents.16
The Appellate Division17 in considering the principal case declared that a
city's immunity from suit arises only in connection with the discharge of a
governmental function directed and required by a state statute. The court
maintained that since there was no statutory requirement that the city accept
the gift of the federal goods, the city in storing these commodities acted
in a proprietary capacity. Similarly, since there was no statutory require-
ment that the city participate in the manufacturing venture of the W.P.A.,
the city in permitting the W.P.A. to use the premises 'assumed the duties of
a landlord, among which is the duty of keeping a common passageway safe.' s
It is submitted that the court's premise is unsound: it is immaterial
whether a governmental activity is imposed or voluntarily assumed.19 The
'lWorkman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 574, 21 S. Ct. 212 (1900); Evans v.
Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E. 203 (1933) ; Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St.
158, 126 N. E. 72 (1919) ; CARDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE (1931) 57; Borchard, Gov-
ernmental -Responsibility in Tort (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 577, 735; Tooke, The Eaten-
sion of Municipal Liability in Tort (1932) 19 VA. L. REv. 97.
12JONEs, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1892) § 27. See also Scales
v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 469, 127 S. E. 543 (1925).
'
3 Burnett v. Rudd, 165 Tenn. 238, 54 S. W. (2d) 718 (1932).
'
4 Nicholson v. Detroit, 129 Mich. 246, 249, 88 N. W. 695 (1902).
15 C.umozo, LAW AND LITERATURE (1931) 57.
'
6Municipalities have been made liable for malpractice by physicians and dentists
in public institutions (GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 50-d, fol. 90) and for negligence of
their employees in the operation of municipal motor vehicles (GENEoRAL MUNICIPAL LAW
§§ 50-a, 50-b, 50-c).
17258 App. Div. 694, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (4th Dep't 1940).
'SLoucks v. Dolan, 211 N. Y. 237, 105 N. E. 411 (1914).
'
9Pope v. New Haven, 91 Conn. 79, 99 Atl. 51 (1916); Bolster v. Lawrence, 225
Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722 (1917); Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171, 50 Am. Rep. 289
(1884) ; Heino v. Grand Rapids, 202 Mich. 363, 168 N. W. 512 (1918); Van Dyke
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essential question in deciding immunity from suit is whether the function was
governmental. Authority and reason favor this proposition. There is no
sound basis for imposing liability when a city voluntarily enters upon a
public service and withholding it when it performs the service under a re-
quirement of imperative law. To maintain this distinction would not
encourage cities voluntarily to make provision for the public good.
However; there is a statutory direction which the court, in its opinion, did
not consider. The Public Welfare Law20 provides: "A city public welfare
district shall be responsible in its territory for the administration of public
relief and care and the expense incident thereto." It further provides :21
"It shall be the duty of public welfare officers insofar as funds are available
for that purpose, to provide for those unable to maintain themselves. They
shall, whenever possible, administer such care and treatment as may restore
such persons to a condition of self-support, and shall further give such ser-
vice to those liable to become destitute as may prevent the necessity of their
becoming public charges." True, the statute does not in specific terms direct
the acceptance of the federal goods or co6peration with the W.P.A. The
Public Welfare Law, however, does not purport specifically to delineate the
various ways in which its purpose may be accomplished. The whole tenor
of the statute indicates that that is to be left to the discretion of the welfare
officials.
Since care of the poor is a public function, and in determining municipal
immunity it is immaterial whether there is a statutory requirement that a
governmental activity be performed, the question resolves itself into a con-
sideration whether the particular means selected by the public welfare
officials do relieve the needy.
An essential and customary part of every relief program is the distribu-
tion of food products. The city may claim immunity from the negligence of
persons employed in this governmental activity.22 The Court of Appeals
assumed this to be correct for the purposes of the appeal. Had the suit been
by a person employed by the city to distribute these goods, based on the
failure of the city to provide a safe place to work, quite clearly his claim
would be rejected; similarly if the suit involved the claim of an indigent
person who went to get some relief commodities.
The above examples, however, are distinguishable from the principal case:
there the injuries arose from the negligent performance of the governmental
function of delivering goods to the poof. Here the injury arose from the
city's having leased part of the building to the W.P.A. If the leasing was a
proprietary function, then the city assumed the duties of a landlord. Leasing,
however, is not in and of itself a proprietary act. Had the city leased part
of its premises without rent to the Department of Water Supply or the De-
partment of Correction, it would not be liable for negligence toward persons
engaged in those departments, or persons who visited those departments to
v. Utica, 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. Supp. 277 (4th 1922); Moulton v. Fargo, 39
N. D. S02, 167 N. W. 717 (1918); 6 McQulLLAN, op. cit. supra note 1, '§ 2797.
2OAr. 5, § 31.
21Art. 9, § 77.22See note 6 supra.
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pay their taxes or fees.23 Those departments perform municipal functions,
and the housing of them is a governmental function. However, where the
city leases part of a municipal building for hire and a person invited to a
private entertainment is injured through the negligence of the city, it is clear
that the city is deprived of its immunity to suit.24
These instances do not precisely fit this case either: the W.P.A. is not a
municipal agency, nor, on the other hand, does the city derive any money
from permitting the premises to be used. The Court of Appeals asserted
that the city voluntarily assisted the W.P.A. project as a convenient means
of reducing the burden of providing relief to the indigent. The city in invit-
ing the W.P.A. workers to use the corridor assumed a duty toward persons
who were not beneficiaries of the city relief work, and for damages caused
by a breach of that duty the city is liable. That the assistance to the W.P.A.
was voluntary, we have seen, is immaterial.23  This was not merely a con-
venient means of reducing the burden of providing relief for the indigent.
The W.P.A. sewing project accomplished two savings: It reduced the cost
of goods to be supplied to the city's destitute because the wages of persons
engaged in the sewing project were paid by the government, and, secondly,
it took persons off the relief rolls, from which all W.P.A. workers on this
project were selected, and made them wage-earners. The motive of the city
in assisting the project was to reduce the cost of caring for the indigent or
leave it free to expend the same amount and accomplish more. Also, it
seems the city's motive was to follow the mandate of the Public Welfare Law
which required the public welfare officials, whenever possible, to administer
such care and treatment to those unable to maintain themselves as may
restore such persons to a condition of self-support. 26  Clearly W.P.A.
workers are more self-supporting than recipients of relief certificates.
That the W.P.A. workers were not beneficiaries of the city is disputable,
for without the actions of the city they would still be on relief. In any event,
this is generally regarded as an immaterial consideration. The liability of a
municipality for the torts of its agents does not depend on the relationship
existing between the city and the person injured, but depends on the capacity
in which the city was acting.
27
It is submitted that the city's participation with the W.P.A. was in further-
ance of a governmental activity-relief of the poor.2 8  Perhaps the Court of
Appeals sought to pursue a "liberal" policy in accordance with the present
23Kelley v. Boston, 186 Mass. 165, 71 N. E. 299 (1904).24Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23, 41 Am. Rep. 185 (1881).
'
5See note 18 supra.
26See note 20 supra.2 7 City of Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18, 112 N. E. 994 (1916) ; Wilcox v. Rochester, 190
N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. 1119 (1907) ; 6 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2795.2 8The opinions of the courts which considered this case do not touch on this vital
question: was the housing of the project by the city a prerequisite of securing W.P.A.
assistance for Binghamton or was it a mere accommodation? If it was a condition,
then in complying with it to accomplish a public service the city was engaged in a
governmehtal activity and assumed none of the liabilities of an ordinary landlord. On
the other hand, if it was a gratuitous act, then it involved no public benefit and the
city is liable to this plaintiff. The indications are that it was part of the initial arrange-
ments and an inducing factor.
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tendency to limit the doctrine of municipal immunity. That, however, should
be left to the legislature. When the courts undertake to misapply or distort
the established rules to give a remedy in a particular case, they intensify the
confusion and unpredictability already existing in the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions.
Bernard R. Rapoport
Practice: Rule 294 of New York Rules of Civil Practice: ,Application
to compromise infants' claims.-Courts of England and the United States
have long looked upon the protection of the rights of infants as their special
responsibility.' In fulfilling this duty, therefore, it is not surprising that a
compromise of an infant's claim has been held to require the approval of a
court before it is binding against the infant.2 There arose, however, a real
need for a procedure which would fully acquaint the court with the facts
of the proposed settlement in order to insure a full protection of the
infant's rights.
' The history of Rule 294 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York
tells the story of the development of such a procedure. Prior to the adoption
of the Rules of Civil Practice,3 there had been in infant settlement cases
no general4 procedural provisions for informing the courts of facts essen-
tial to the protection of the infant's claim.5 Therefore, Rule 2946 was in-
cluded as a new rule although its forerunner had been found in the Rules of
the Surrogate Court of New York County.7
'In re Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936 (1920); De Gristina v. Swift & Co.,
158 Misc. 91, 285 N. Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. Ct. 1936); People v. Kane, 79 Misc. 140, 139
N. Y. Supp. 350 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd vere., 161 App. Div. 956, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1105
(2d Dep't 1914) ; City of New York v. Chelsea Jute Mills, 43 Misc. 266, 88 N. Y. Supp.
1085 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1904); Butler v. Freeman, Ambl. 301, 27 Eng. Rep. 204
(Ch. 1756) ; Eure v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wins. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).2The Etna, 8 F. Cas. No. 4,542, 1 Ware 474 (D. Me. 1838) ; Mathews v. Doner, 292
Ill. 592, 127 N. E. 137 (1920) ; Williams v. Williams, 204 Ill. 44, 68 N. E. 449 (1903) ;
Joyce v. Washington Storage Warehouse & Van Co., 176 App. Div. 176, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 519 (1st Dep't 1917) ; Edsall v. Vandemark, 39 Barb. 589 (N. Y. 1863).3The Rules of Civil Practice were adopted by a convention of justices, lawyers and
members of legislative committees in June, 1920 and became effective October 1, 1921,
thereby supplanting the General Rules of Practice.4But see NEw YORK JUDICIARY LAW § 474 (as amended L. 1912, c. 229, effective
Sept. 1, 1912).5However, in Matter of Reifschneider, 60 App. Div. 478, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1069 (3d
Dep't 1901), the defendant attorney was formally reprimanded for presenting a pro-
posed settlement of an infant's claim without disclosing to the court the fact that he
was regularly engaged by the defendant to consummate such compromises. See Matter
of Wilbur, 228 App. Div. 197, 200, 239 N. Y. Supp. 483 (1st Dep't 1930).6
"On any application for the approval by the court of a settlement of a cause of action
belonging to an infant the court shall require the attorney so applying to disclose his
relation to the defendant, and whether he has become concerned in the application of its
subject matter at the instance of such defendant, or has received or is to receive any
compensation from such defendant and the amount thereof, or has any part in nego-
tiating such settlement; and thereupon, if the court or judge deem it necessary, a full
examination may be had into all the facts regarding the reasonableness and propriety
of such settlement."7 Rule XXII, as amended Nov. 13, 1920, read: "Compromise. Upon application for
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Practice under the new rule was uncertain. Although the rule on its face
was unequivocal, it became common for attorneys to neglect both to get court
orders and to submit the papers required by Rule 294. The frequency with
which the requisites of the rule were disregarded came to light as a result
of the Ambulance Chasing Investigation in New York City in 1930. Dis-
ciplinary proceedings were instituted against several members of the bar for
failure to apply for orders approving the settlements,8 among other charges
of misconduct. The defense interposed was a well-recognized custom of dis-
posing of trivial cases without the formality of obtaining an order of com-
promise and an understanding that the requirement of a court order was not
mandatory in small cases. As a result of the court's failure to accept this
explanation, the defendants were either censured or suspended.9
Another group of disciplinary proceedings arose out of the failure of many
attorneys to obtain court orders fixing attorney's fees in settlement cases in
compliance with Section 474 of the Judiciary Law'0 and Rule 294." As a
result some m'embers of the bar were either disbarred,12 suspended13 or cen-
leave to compromise it should appear by the affidavit by petitioner's attorney that he
has investigated the subject matter of the compromise or the facts of any alleged cause
of action whether or not the attorney has become concerned in the application or its
subject matter at the instance of the party with whom the compromise is proposed or
at the instance of any representative of guch party." There were also special instruc-
tions to attorneys in regard to compliance with the rule setting forth the specific in-
formation to be included within the affidavit. The revised rule of the New York County
Surrogate covering compromises is now Rule XVIII as adopted Nov. 15, 1935.
8Matter of Batt, 230 App. Div. 656, 246 N. Y. Supp. 77 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Matter of
Linden, 228 App. Div. 497, 240 N. Y. Supp. 274 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Matter of Kreizvogel,
228 App. Div. 490, 240 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Matter of Uran, 227 App.
Div. 496, 238 N. Y. Stipp. 596 (1st Dep't 1930); Matter of Springer, 227 App. Div.
490, 238 N. Y. Supp. 591 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Matter of Seligsohn, 227 App. Div. 480, 238
N. Y. Supp. 627 (1st Dep't' 1930).
DMatter of Batt, 230 App. Div. 656, 246 N. Y. Supp. 77 (1st Dep't 1930) (severe
censure); Matter of Linden, 228 App. Div. 497, 240 N. Y. Supp. 274 (1st Dep't 1930)
(not disciplined for single failure to obtain order but two year suspension for other
reasons) ; Matter of Kreizvogel, 228 App. Div. 490, 240 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dep't
1930) (censure); Matter of Uran, 227 App. Div. 496, 238 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1st Dep't
1930) (censure); Matter of Springer, 227 App. Div. 490, 238 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1st Dep't
1930) (suspension for one year); Matter of Seligsohn, 227 App. Div. 480, 238 N. Y.
Supp. 627 (1st Dep't 1930) (suspension for one year). It should be recognized, how-
ever, that in each of these cases other charges of professional misconduct were proved.
1 0 Section 474, among other provisions as to compensation of an attorney, requires
that an attorney must obtain a court order fixing his fees in the case of a compromise of
an infant's cause of action.
"lRule 294 as in force from 1921 to 1939 required that the attorney for an infant
plaintiff who seeks leave to compromise must disclose whether he "has received or is
to receive any compensation from such defendant and the amount thereof, . . ." See
supra note 6.1 2Matter of Gordon, 229 App. Div. 88, 241 N. Y. Supp. 263 (1st Dep't 1930) (solici-
tation of negligence cases and submission to court of false affidavits also proved).
13 Matter of Fieldsteel, 228 App. Div. 470, 240 N. Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dep't 1930)
(two year suspension; solitication of personal injury cases also proved); Matter of
Vail, 228 App. Div. 217, 239 N. Y. Supp. 414 (1st Dep't 1930) (six month suspension;
solicitation of negligence cases also proved). In the former case the court expressed its
disapproval of agreements between a doctor and lawyer by which the former recom-
mends the attorney and the latter acts as collector of medical fees by deducting that
amount from the sum due to the client.
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sured.1 4 It came to light that certain judges of the Municipal Court of New
York City did not require such orders due to the erroneous impression that
Section 474 did not apply to the Municipal Court. Some judges of that
court even refused to fix the attorney's compensation although an order had
been submitted to them." This practice on the part of the Municipal Court
was specifically condemned by the Appellate Division. 16 Attorneys in these
cases, however, were not held responsible for the court's failure to act
since they had attempted to comply with the law by submitting the orders.
A third practice grew up under the provisions of Rule 294 which was far
more widespread in its use. That involved the settlement of infants' claims
against an insured defendant. It was common practice for the representa-
tive of the insurance company to suggest to the parent of the injured infant
a compromise of the claim against its insured. Upon acceptance by the parent,
the latter would be directed to an "outside attorney" who, although not on
the company's legal staff, was friendly to it. This attorney would draw the
necessary papers for the appointment of the parent as guardian ad litem and
would, by arrangement, serve a summons on the company's attorney. Upon
the filing of a notice of appearance by the latter, the attorney "representing"
the infant would then petition the court for leave to compromise for the
agreed amount. After the granting of an order to the guardian ad litem
for leave to compromise, both the guardian's bond and the attorney's fee
would be paid by the insurance company.
The ethical character of this practice had been questioned before the in-
clusion of Rule 294 in the Rules of Civil Practice even though the attorney
had made full disclosure of the facts to the court.' 7 Clarification of the
application of the rule did not come about until 1930 as a result of the Am-
bulance Chasing Investigation. In Matter of Wilbur'8 the conduct of the
"outside attorney" was found by the Appellate Division to be not censurable
although specifically not approvable.' 9 The City Court of New York City
in the same year set forth in succinct fashion the procedure to be observed
in every application for approval of a compromise of an infant's claim.
In its decision the court added certain new facts which it required in the
infant-plaintiff's affidavit in addition to those covered by Rule 294.20 It
14Matter of Kreizvogel, 228 App. Div. 490, 240 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dep't 1930)
(solicitation in one instance and failure to obtain court orders for settlements were
also proved). See .mipra note 8.
15Matter of Fink, 229 App. Div. 338, 241 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Matter
of Jeromer, 228 App. Div. 123, 239 N. Y. Supp. 304 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Matter of Gold-
berg, 227 App. Div. 502, 238 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1st Dep't 1930).
16See supra note 15.
17YEAR BooK, NEw YORK LAWY.ERS ASSOCIATION (1921) 127-128. See supra note 5.
18228 App. Div. 197, 239 N. Y. Supp. 483 (1st Dep't 1930).
10Dowling, P. J., observing that bar association committees had not condemned the
practice, pointed out, at page 202, that there was no special trust or confidence placed
in the "outside attorney" because the relationship between attorney and client was one
"on paper" only and not fiduciary.201n Lentine v. Jacobs, 137 Misc. 403, 243 N. Y. Supp. 114 (City Ct. N. Y. 1930),
the court, setting forth the nine steps in the procedure for every application for approval
of settlement of an infant's claim, states, at page 406: "8. The affidavit of the attorney
making the application, in addition to the information required by rule 294 of the Rules
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was six years before any other court took an opportunity to discuss the
question. In DeGristina v. Swift & Co? 1 the New York Supreme Court
made it clear that:
"Defendants or their insurance companies should not be permitted to
furnish or even suggest an attorney to carry on the necessary proceed-
ings for the effectuation of settlement agreements that are made through
adjusters and parents or others who are supposed to act for the benefit
of infants .... Under such circumstances the parent should be requested
to select his own attorney or, in event of his failure to do so, an applica-
tion should be made to the court for appointment of an attorney. '22
Fear was expressed, however, that even this type of procedure would result
in perfunctory representation of an infant's rights by an attorney assigned
to the case by the court.2
3
The admonition of the First Department of the Appellate Division in the
Wilbur Case in 1930 was reiterated by the Second Department in Matter of
Paders4 involving the same general fact situation. The court pointed out
the error of the belief that Rule 294 authorized such practice by the "outside
attorney." 25  It was made clear that the purpose of the rule was to advise
the court of any interest conflicting with that of the infant and was not in-
tended to encourage the practice. Along with these judicial declarations,
special rules were adopted by certain courts to guarantee proper representa-
tion of the infant's rights2 6
Such was the situation up to the year 1939. Need was felt for an amend-
ment to the rule.2 7  Accordingly, it was amended28 but shortly thereafter
of Civil Practice, shall set forth by whom, on what date and under what terms he
was retained; the acts of negligence complained of; the terms of the proposed settle-
ment for personal injuries and loss of services and a brief statement of his reasons for
recommending the same; the services rendered by the attorney in the action, and the
fee he asks to be allowed. .. ."21158 Misc. 91, 285 N. Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. Ct. 1936).2 21d. at 93.
2 3Expressed in a speech by New York Supreme Court Justice Heath delivered at the
Lawyers' Institute, sponsored by the Federation of Bar Associations of the Sixth
Judicial District of New York and the Cornell Law School.
24250 App. Div. 418, 294 N. Y. Supp. 252 (2d Dep't 1937).
2 5The position maintained by some attorneys that Rule 294 authorized such practice
was due perhaps to a report published in 44 NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS
(1921) 75-79.2 6Rule 4-C of the Special Rules Regulating the Conduct of Attorneys and Counsellors-
at-Law in the First Judicial District. See also Horan v. Greig, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 67
(City Ct. N. Y. 1939).2 7FoURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK(Leg. Doc. No. 48, 1938) 50-51; FIFTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK (Leg. Doc. No. 48, 1939) 46-47.2 S"Application to compromise infants' claims; conflicting interests of infants' attor-
neys. No attorney having or representing any interest conflicting with that of an infant
may represent such infant.
"On any application for the approval by the court of a settlement of a cause of action
belonging to an infant, the court shall require the attorney so applying to disclose by
affidavit by whom, on what date and under what terms he was retained, the services
rendered by him, the fee he asks to be allowed, the acts complained of, the terms of the
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a second amendment was made.29 Thus the rule in its present form became
effective January 15, 1940.30 Its statement is clear and unambiguous. It in
effect codifies the decisions under the old 29431 and derives its provisions
from the requirements set forth in Lentine v. Jacobs.32 The added provision
allowing the defendant's attorney to draw the papers required for a settle-
ment of an infant's claim is a sensible one. It thus leaves to the court the
determination of the reasonableness of the proposed compromise. Knowing
that it and it alone is charged with the protection of the infant's rights, the
court will probably not dispose of this type of case perfunctorily. In any
event, the court will, under the new rule, be made aware of all the important
facts. The camouflage of the "friendly suit" will be a thing of the past and
the rights of an infant plaintiff will, it is hoped, be given at least unbiased
representation.
Robert S. Lesher
proposed settlement with a brief statement of his reasons for recommending the same;
and to state that he has not become concerned in the application or its subject matter at
the instance of such defendant directly or indirectly and that he has not received and is
not to receive any compensation from such defendant directly or indirectly; and there-
upon, if the court or judge deem it necessary, a full examination may be had into all
the facts regarding the reasonableness and propriety of such settlement and of the fee
which the infant's attorney asks to be allowed."29Adopted January 15, 1940 pursuant to a recommendation in the SIXTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Leg. Doc. No. 48,
1940) 50-51.30
"Rule 294. Application to compromise infants' claims; conflicting interests of infants'
attorneys.
"No attorney having or representing any interest conflicting with that of an infant
may represent such infant.
"On any application for the approval by the court of a settlement of a cause of action
belonging to an infant, if the infant and his guardian are represented by an attorney,
the court shall require the attorney to disclose by affidavit by whom, on what date
and under what terms he was retained, the services rendered by him, the fee he asks to
be allowed, the acts complained of, the terms of the proposed settlement with a brief
statement of his reasons for recommending the same; and to state that he has not
become concerned in the application or its subject matter at the instance of such defend-
ant directly or indirectly and that he has not received and is not to receive any com-
pensation from such defendant directly or indirectly; and thereupon, if the court or judge
deem it necessary, a full examination by the court or judge or by an official referee
may be had into all the facts regarding the reasonableness and propriety of such settle-
ment and of the fee which the infant's attorney asks to be allowed.
"If the infant and his guardian are not represented by an attorney, the papers re-
quired for the application may be prepared by the attorney for the defendant and shall
state that fact, the terms of the proposed settlement and the facts with reference to the
cause of action, but such attorney shall make no recommendation in reference to the
proposed settlement. The court or judge under such circumstances shall make a full
examination into all the facts regarding the reasonableness and propriety of the pro-
posed settlement, and may refer the matter to an official referee for investigation and
report thereon.
"Upon the approval of a proposed settlement by the court or judge, an order of settle-
ment or a judgment may be entered without costs."
Along with the affidavit required by this rule, there should be submitted to the court
a petition of the guardian ad litem, an affidavit of attending physician and the acknowl-
edged consent of the infant if over fourteen years of age.3IMatter of Paders, 250 App. Div. 418, 294 N. Y. Supp. 252 (2d Dep't 1937) ; Matter
of Wilbur, 228 App. Div. 197, 239 N. Y. Supp. 483 (1st Dep't 1930); De Gristina v.
Swift & Co., 158 Misc. 91, 285 N. Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
S2137 Misc. 403, 243 N. Y. Supp. 114 (City Ct. N. Y. 1930).
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Real Property: Rights of adjoining landowners/to percolating waters.-
In a recent case, Rothrauff v. Sinking Springs Water Co., 14 A.
(2d) 87 (Pc. Sup. Ct. 1940), Pennsylvania has professed its allegiance to
the doctrine that a landowner may make but a "reasonable use" of the water
percolating beneath his property. That the doctrine itself represents the
decided weight of authority among the more modern American cases, besides
being entirely rational in the light of our more advanced geological knowledge,
is not open to question,' but in view of the circumstances underlying the
instant case, it is at least debatable whether the result here achieved does
not constitute a complete misapplication of the fundamental principles upon
which the doctrine is based.
Defendant, a corporation engaged in the business of selling water to the
public, had a contract to purchase the effluent of a spring situated on plain-
tiffs' land. Finding that the supply of water received from the spring was
inadequate for its needs, defendant secured plaintiffs' permission to sink a well
on their land and to pump water therefrom. The increased supply remain-
ing inadequate, defendant took options on adjoining land and sunk several
more wells, the last of which produced water in the desired quantity, but
permanently stopped the flow of plaintiffs' spring. The court held that the
sinking of the last well and the use of the water so obtained for the purpose
of sale and distribution was a tortious act for which plaintiffs could have
recovered resulting damages at common law, and which, therefore, was a
breach of the existing contract as it prevented performance on the part of
plaintiffs.
2
Percolating waters are "those which pass through the ground beneath the
surface of the earth without any definite channel, and do not form a part
of the body or flow, surface or subterranean, of any watercourse."3  An
early distinction drawn between the law governing natural watercourses and
that concerning percolating waters is found in Acton v. Blundell,4 decided
by the Exchequer Chamber in . 1843, where the court literally applied the
maxim, cuiu.s est solum eius est usque ad caelum et ad inferos (to whom the
soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths) "whether it [the
land below his property] is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth,
or part soil, part water . . . ,"5 in favor of the defendant and held that any
user of percolating water resulting in a diversion or even a complete appro-
priation of the supply beneath the land of an adjacent owner was damnur
absque injuria. This rule was applied by the English courts to an appro-
priation for commercial sale off the premises6 and even to a malicious taking.
7
'Farnham, Percolating Water and the Common Law (1913) 19 CASE AND COMMENT
664.2Rothrauff v. Sinking Springs Water Co., 14 A. (2d) 87, 90, 91 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1940).
.
3BLACx, LAW DIcrIoxARY (2d ed. 1910).
412 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843).5Acton v. Blundell, supra note 4, at 353.6 Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349 (1859), aff'g 2 Hurlst. & N. 168 (Ex. 1859).7Mayor, etc. of Bradford v. Pickles, (1895) A. C. 587. But see Ballard v. Tom-
linson, L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 115 (1885), holding that the rule did not apply to pollution
of percolating, water.
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It was followed in most of the earlier American cases 8 and in several fairly
recent ones,' although the earlier American decisions seem to have made
exceptions in cases of pollution, 10 malicious interception, 1 and waste.12
The manifest injustice of the English rule appears to have been first
recognized by way of dictum in several New Hampshire cases,13 and in
Forbell v. City of New York'" the American rule of "reasonable user" was
actually applied in decision. The court held that it was reasonable for the
owner of the soil to use so much of the water as might be necessary for or
incidental to the full use and enjoyment of his premises, but that he could
not use it for purposes unconnected therewith, if in so doing he should
diminish the available supply to an extent that an adjacent owner could not
employ his land for its natural and proper purposes. Thus, in New York
and other jurisdictions one may presumably appropriate all the available
percolating water provided he uses it for agriculture, manufacturing, mining,
irrigation or for other purposes connected with the beneficial use of his
land' 5 and provided he does not waste it.16 Although the taking of such
water for sale off the premises has generally been held to be an "unreason-
able use,"17 it is not unreasonable per se under the Forbell doctrine, and
becomes so only when an adjacent landowner is deprived of the natural
enjoyment of his property.'8
8For collected cases, see 3 TIPEANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 746, n. 46;
note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 1385.9Nourse v. Andrews, 200 Ky. 467, 255 S. W. 467 (1923) ; Heninger v. McGinnis, 131
Va. 70, 108 S. E. 671 (1921); Hunte v. Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 Fac. 137 (1919).
lOL. A. Wilder, Correlative Rights in Percolating Waters (1913) 19 CASE AND CoM-
MENT 677, 668.
"See 3 TInFANY, REAL PROPERT- (3d ed. 1939) § 746.21bld.
'
8 Swett v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276 (1870) ; Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862).
14164 N. Y. 522, 55 N. E. 644 (1900). See also Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App.
Div. 340, 46 N. Y. Supp. 141 (2d Dep't 1897).15Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936);
Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917); Dunbar v. Sweeney, 230
N. Y. 609, 130 N. E. 913 (1921) ; Rouse v. City of Kinston, 188 N. C. 1, 123 S. E.
482, 35 A. L. R. 1203, 1222 (1924) ; Houston & T. C. R.R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81
S. W. 279 (1904); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S. E. 308, 55
A. L. R. 1376, 1386 (1927) ; Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P. (2d) 904(1935).
'
8 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S. W. (2d) 889 (1935).lTSloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936);
Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917); Gagnon v. French Lick
Springs Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 76 N. E. 849 (1904); Clark County v. Mississippi
Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 535, 31 So. 905 (1902) ; Braidburn Realty Co. v. City of East
Orange, 107 N. J. L. 291, 153 Atl. 714 (1931); Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77
N. J. L. 623, 74 Atl. 623 (1909) ; Dunbar v. Sweeney, 230 N. Y. 609, 130 N. E. 913(1921); Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N. Y. 522, 55 N. E. 644 (1900) ; Clinchfield
Coal Co. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S. E. 308, 55 A. L. R. 1376, 1385 (1927) ; Evans
v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P. (2d) 984 (1935) ; Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va.
296, 52 S. E. 702, 6 L. R. A. (N.s.) 266 (1902). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939)§ 862, comment (b).
18 See discussion in Davidson v. City of Ann Arbor, 237 Mich. 453, 212 N. W. 81
(1927) ; Braidburn Realty Co. v. City of East Orange, supra note 17.
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Another version of the American doctrine of "reasonable user" is the rule
of "correlative rights." While loosely attributed by some courts to the
Forbell case, this version was in reality established by Katz v. Walkinshaw,19
where the California court held that "the use which any man can make of
the water underneath his land must be determined by the needs of all others
located over the same reservoir. '20  Under this test, a "reasonable user"
is determined primarily by the quantity of water taken, rather than the
purpose for which it is employed.21 Where water was scarce and rainfall
uncertain, the sale of percolating water off the premises has been deemed
unreasonable,2 2 but only where more than an aliquot share was taken.2 3
The Restatement of Torts takes the position that an intentional harm
resulting from a diversion of percolating water is unreasonable and wrong-
ful unless the utility of the use outweighs the gravity of the harm,2 an
intentional harm being defined as one where the actor (a) acts for the pur-
pose of causing it; or (b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially cer-
tain to result from what he is doing.25 In other words, the Torts Restatement
imports into the law of percolating waters the standard of reasonableness
which has long been the controlling factor in the general field of nuisances.2 0
Both the New York and the California decisions can be viewed as con-
sistent with the Restatement position, which obviously permits the considera-
tion of place of use and proportionate consumption in determining the
reasonableness of the diversion. While the harm inflicted by defendant in
the instant case would at the outset be classified as unintentional, the harm
caused by its continued abstraction of the water after notice of its effect on
plaintiffs' spring would seem to be intentional, and lawful only if reasonable.
Long applied in western jurisdictions to watercourses, the rule of "prior
appropriation and use" has recently been applied to percolating water by
the Utah court in Wrathall v. Johnson,27 where it was held that a prior user
of percolating water has a vested right in the amount of his appropriation
and any interference therewith by a subsequent appropriator is a wrongful
19141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1902), aff'd, 141 Cal. 128, 74 Pac. 766 (1903).
20Farnham, Percolating Water and the Common Law (1913) 19 CASE AND COMINT
664, 665. Article XIV, Sec. 3, of the California Constitution (1928), embodies the
doctrine of the Walkinshaw case. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. (2d) 351,
40 P. (2d) 486 (1935).
212 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS (2d ed. 1918) § 1192. See also Glover
v. Utah Oil Refining Company, 62 Utah 174, 218 Pac. 955 (1923); Home v. Utah
Oil Refining Company, 59 Utah 279, 202 Pac. 815 (1921).22Coachella Valley County Water District v. Stevens, 206 Cal. 400, 266 Pac. 341
(1928) ; Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 Pac. 115 (1910) ; Los Angeles
v. Hunter, 156 Cal. 603, 105 Pac. 755 (1909) ; Cohen v. La Canada Land & Water Co.,
151 Cal. 680, 91 Pac. 584 (1907) ;. Newport v. Temescal Water Co., 149 Cal. 531, 87
Pac. 372 (1906) ; Katz v. Walkinshaw, supra note 19.23See discussion in Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 105
Minn. 182, 117 N. W. 435 (1908); Cohen v. La Canada Land & Water Co., supra
note 22.
2 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) §§ 860, 861.
251d. at §§ 850, comment (a), 859.
26d. at § 862, 863.
2786 Utah 50, 40 P. (2d) 755 (1935). The opinion was written by Moffat, J., Hanson,
J., concurring. Straup, C.J., Hansen, J., and Folland, J., concurred on other grounds.
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act. This view, while not surprising in a state committed in general to the
doctrine of prior appropriation, is of course entirely out of line with both
the old and the new common law as to percolating waters.
In reaching its decision in the instant case, the Pennsylvania court ex-
pressly approved a line of Pennsylvania cases holding that unlimited
appropriation for on-the-premises consumption is lawful, 28 in the absence
of malice or negligence.29 It would appear, therefore, that the court adopted
the "purpose criteria" of the Forbell case rather than the "quantitative test"
of the Walkinshaw case, but in applying the doctrine so adopted, it apparently
overlooked two important factors: (1) Both plantiffs and defendant were
using the water for artificial purposes, viz., selling it off the land; (2)
plaintiffs' land was not rendered unfit for its natural enjoyment.30 Where
adjoining landowners are each in the business of extracting and selling water
off the premises, it has been held in "purpose criteria" jurisdictions that
neither party is liable for the diversion of percolating water "because each
is engaged in the exercise of a legal right and the rights of each are equal
in the use and enjoyment of the land."31  By holding that defendant's use
was unreasonable, despite the fact that both plaintiffs and defendant were
extracting the water for substantially identical purposes, the Pennsylvania
court has in reality denied to defendant an equal right in the water table
beneath his property. So long as the water table has not been lowered to
an extent that plaintiffs are deprived of the natural enjoyment of their
land, it is not within the contemplation of the Forbell doctrine that defendant
be denied the geological advantages of its land.
Moreover, it has been suggested that water used for commercial purposes
becomes imbued with the legal attributes of oil and gas.32  In this field,
where all competing users are normally employing or marketing their product
off the land, the Pennsylvania courts have steadfastly held that appropria-
tion to the detriment of an adjoining owner is non-actionable. 33
The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that the court has in fact
applied the doctrine of "prior appropriation" while paying mere lip service
to the New York version of the "reasonable user" rule, and in so doing
has achieved a result which is entirely conflicting therewith.
The question remains, however, whether the court's judgment for plain-
tiffs is sustainable on a purely contract basis. This point will be discussed
in a subsequent issue of the QUARTERLY. Fredeik L. Raker
2sWilliams v. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283, 29 Atl. 54 (1894); Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626,
51 Am. Rep. 542 (1884); Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81, 21 Am. Rep. 93 (1875);
Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514, 84 Am. Dec. 511 (1863); Wheatley v. Baugh,
25 Pa. 228, 64 Am. Dec. 721 (1855).
29Zimmerman v. Union Paving Co., 335 Pa. 319, 6 A. (2d) 901 (1939); Collins v.
Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 Atl. 1012 (1890).3 0While this fact was not adverted to in the opinion, it clearly appears in the paper
books submitted by counsel.
St Merrick Water Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 32 App. Div. 454, 53 N. Y. Supp. 60
(2d Dep't 1898), aff'd w. o. op., 160 N. Y. 657, 55 N. E. 1097 (1899), distinguishing
Smith v. City of Brooklyn, mtpra note 14. See also Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer,
92 Minn. 230, 99 N. W. 882 (1904).32See note (1909) 9 Co. L. REv. 543, 544.
B3 Hamilton v. Foster, 272 Pa. 95, 116 Atl. 50 (1922); Westmoreland Natural Gas
Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889).
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Taxation: Constitutional Law: Validity of sales tax by seller state on
interstate transaction.-A vital, modern, problem in state sales taxation is
presented by the recent New York Court of Appeals decision in O'Kane v.
State of New York, 283 N. Y. 439, 28 N. E. (2d) 905 (1940), and its solu-
tion, if and when it is determined by the Supreme Court, will do much toward
dispelling the area of doubt created by the Court in the McGoldrick v.
Beruind-White Coal Mining Co. case and related cases.'
The O'Kane case concerns the constitutionality of a New York sales tax
on "all sales and agreements to sell . . .and all deliveries or transfers of
stock .... "2 Appellants-complainants are engaged in the securities and in-
vestment business with offices in New York City. They agreed as a result
of negotiations via mail, telephone, and telegraph to sell a certain number of
shares of stock to two customer firms, one in Philadelphia, and the other in
Washington, D. C. The customer firms mailed confirmations to the New
York seller firms which in turn mailed confirmations of the sale to the pur-
chasers. The securities themselves were mailed by appellants to banks in
Philadelphia and Washington for delivery upon payment of sight drafts
attached to the certificates. The New York Court of Appeals in a 4-3 de-
cision upheld the tax, and, relying heavily upon the Berwind-White decision,
rejected the proposals that the tax discriminated against interstate commerce
and that it subjected interstate commerce to the risk of cumulative taxes.
Lehman, Ch. J., dissenting, and Loughran and Conway, JJ., maintained that
the stock transfer tax, being on the seller and not the buyer, was dissimilar
to the sales tax in the Berwind-White case (where the tax was held analogous
to a use tax), and that it did impose upon interstate commerce the possibility
of "multiple burdens," absent in the Bemind-White case, which "might im-
pede or destroy such commerce."3
The history of the validity of state taxation upon interstate activity dis-
closes a definite swing in the judicial pendulum away from the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause in 1887 to' the effect that
"Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount
of the tax is laid on domestic commerce," 4 towards the quite contrary proposi-
'McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Company, 60 Sup. Ct. 388 (U. S. 1940);
McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Company, 60 Sup. Ct. 404 (U. S. 1940),;
McGoldrick v. A. H. DuGrenier, Inc., 60 Sup. Ct. 404 (U. S. 1940).2 N. Y. TAx LAW §§ 270, 270-a.
3283 N. Y. 439, 453, 28 N. E. (2d) 905 (1940).
4 This doctrine of universal immunity of interstafe sales originated in Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497, 7 Sup. Ct. 592 (1887), but a series of de-
cisions thereafter modified this broad holding and thereby enlarged the taxing area
available to the states. In Banker Brothers v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210, 32 Sup. Ct.
38 (1911), the court sustained a Pennsylvania sales tax upon the sale of an auto, ordered
from an extrastate manufacturer, by a local dealer to a local customer. The Court held
such a sale to be intrastate commerce, in effect limiting the Robbins case immunity to
sales negotiated within the state of the buyer by extrastate vendors or their agents.
Accord, Graybar Electric Company v. Curry, 238 Ala. 116, 189 So. 186 (1939), aff'd per
curiam, 308 U. S. 513, 60 Sup. Ct. 139 (1939).
The whittling process was further effectuated by Gregg Dyeing Company v. Query,
286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631 (1931), the Court there sustaining a storage tax on all
oil transported from extrastate sources, though the tax was clearly to offset the burden
carried by intrastate oil sales in the form of a local use tax. Three years later the non-
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tion stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1932 that "Interstate commerce must
pay its way"5 and that it must contribute its fair share to the state tax bur-
dens. 6 In the three recent decisions of Wester., Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev-
enue,7 Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen,8 and Gwin, White, and
Prince Company v. Henneford,9 the Supreme Court has attempted to solve
the problem of how to require interstate commerce to compensate the states
for the protection and convenience of their laws and agencies without sub-
jecting such commerce to either discrimination or cumulative tax burdens
from which intrastate transactions are free. The result of these three de-
cisions has been the promulgation of a new criterion to guide the Court. Com-
mentators have since labeled it the "multiple burden doctrine."
The Adams case dearly establishes what the Court has in mind when it
speaks of multiple burdens. There, the appellant-complainant manufactured
certain machinery in Indiana, having its home office in that state. Eighty
percent of its goods were sold to customers outside the state. Orders were
taken by agents in other states, subject to home office approval, and payments
were remitted to the home office. The Court found the Indiana Gross Income
Tax Act of 1933 to be a tax of 1% upon the gross receipts from appellant's
sales, both local and interstate (rather than a charter fee, or franchise tax, or
an excise upon the privilege of manufacturing, or a property tax), and held
it invalid, saying: "The vice of the Statute as applied to receipts from inter-
state sales is that the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, re-
ceipts derived from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction
is of such a character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest
extent by States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they
are manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk
of a double burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed .. .. "10
(Italics supplied.)
To illustrate: Suppose that a piece of machinery is manufactured in state
X at ihe cost of $200, and is retailed in state Y for $400. The extra margin
of $200 consists of $100 net profit and $100 added cost incurred because of
expenditures in state Y (advertising, distribution, delivery, local staff, etc.).
If state X were permitted to tax the entire $400 and were not restricted to
the taxation of that portion of the gross receipts which could be traced to
taxable field was more clearly circumscribed in Wiloil Corporation v. Pennsylvania, 294
U. S. 169, 55 Sup. Ct. 358 (1934), the decision there holding that a sales tax was invalid
where interstate commerce was not "required or contemplated" by the contract of sale.5New Jersey Telephone Company v. Tax Board, 280 U. S. 338, 351, 50 Sup. Ct. 111
(1929).0For excellent, full discussion of the general problem of state taxation and its conflict
with the Commerce Clause, U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, see Lockhart, The Sales Tax in
Interstate Commerce (1939) 52 HAv. L. Rlv. 617; Lockhart, State Barriers to Inter-
state Trade (1940) 53 HAv. L. REv. 1284; Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal
Authority by the Taxing Power of the State (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 321, 572, 932,(1919) 32 HAv. L. REv. 234, 374, 634, 902, esp. 374-416; Powell, New Light on Gross
Receipts Taxes (1940) 53 H~Av. L. Rav. 909; Warren and Shlesinger, Sales and Use
Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 49.
7303 U. S. 250, 58 Sup. Ct. 546, 115 A. L. R. 944, 952 (1937).
8304 U. S. 307, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 117 A. L. R. 429, 444 (1938).
9305 U. S. 434, 59 Sup. Ct. 325 (1938).
10304 U. S. 307, 311, 58 Sup. Ct. 913 (1938).
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activities within X's state boundaries, state Y could likewise tax the same
$400 sale since part of this resulted from transactions within Y's jurisdiction.
In consequence, the interstate sale of a machine from the home office to Y state
would be subjected to the risk of duplicate sales taxes or "multiple burdens"
while the sale of the same machine to a local buyer in state X would need
absorb but one tax.
The Berwind-White decision, handed down at the last term (1940) of the
Court has puzzled students in the general field because the multiple burden
doctrine was not applied despite the fact that Mr. Justice Stone, who firit
enunciated the theory, wrote the majority opinion.". By employing the "local
event" yardstick, and thereby permitting the segregation of the act of de-
livering the goods as a "local event," and by stressing that the nature of the
sales tax involved was analogous to a use tax, the Court was able theoreti-
cally to circumvent the multiple burden doctrine. But actually, as pointed
out by Hughes, Ch. J., in writing for the dissent, the threat of cumulative
taxation was as much present in the Berwind-White sales tax case as in the
gross receipts cases.'"
It is submitted that one can resolve the seeming conflict in the decision of
these two classes of cases by recognizing that the Berwind-White decision
possibly rests on practical and economic considerations13 which are more con-
cerned with achieving a uniform system of state sales taxation throughout the
Union, and which are less theoretical and mechanical than those underlying
the multiple burden doctrine. For it has become increasingly evident to the
Court that it is difficult for each state to determine accurate apportionment
mathematically or otherwise, 14 and the states are never sure that their alloca-
tion formulae will be acceptable to the Court.
By placing its stamp of approval on a buyer's state tax despite the poten-
tial threat of duplicate taxes,' 5 the Court may be intending to correct such
impediments to the smooth functioning of our state taxing systems, and at
ISee Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes (1940) 53 HA~v. L. REv. 909;
Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade (1940) 53 H~Av. L. Rrv. 1284; notes(1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 422; (1940) 34 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 329; (1940) 9 FORD. L.
REv. 244; (1940) 15 IND. L. REv. 318; (1940) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 459; (1940)
88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 752.
'
2There is language in the Berwind-White case to the effect that either transfer of
title or possession is a sufficient basis for the tax [60 Sup. Ct. 388, 391 (1940)): "the tax
is conditional upon events occurring within the state, either transfer of title or posses-
sion of the purchased property." This would mean that in cases like McGoldrick v. Felt
and Tarrant Manufacturing Company, and McGoldrick v. A. H. DuGrenier, Inc., the
same sale might be taxed by both New York and Illinois (or Massachusetts in the
latter case) because while the delivery was in New York, the agreement was subject
to home office approval. Likewise, the minority in the Berwind-White case points out
that if New York can tax the delivery, Pennsylvania can tax the shipment, and New
Jersey the transshipment, thereby creating multiple taxation. [60 Sup. Ct. 388, 403
(1940)].
'
3
"We are unable to say that the present tax ... subjects the commerce involved...
to any greater burden . . . in any economw or practical way, whether the purchase
order or the contract precedes or follows the interstate shipment." McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 388, 396 (1940) (minority opinion).
14Chertoff, Some Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon State Business Taxes on
Mildt-State Enterprises (1940) 6 U. oF Pir-r. L. REv. 249.
15 See pupra note 8.
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the same time erase the possibility of multiple taxation. For the tax by the
buyer state does not unduly burden interstate commerce since all sales in the
buyer state, both local and interstate, absorb the same tax---one pays no less
than the other.16 The opinion in the Berwind-White case is silent as to seller
state taxes and no hint is there given as to whether they will be upheld. But
it is clear that if the policy here suggested is the real one underlying the de-
cision, the Court would necessarily be required to invalidate 'any seller state
sales tax such as that of the principle case. A tax by the state of origin opens
wide the doors of cumulative taxation in that those goods transported from
the seller state would be placed at a disadvantage alongside local goods in
those states which levied no sales tax.1 7 And even if the buyer state did levy
a sales tax on all goods, including local merchandise, in cases like the instant
one the interstate sale would be burdened by two sales taxes-one in the
seller and one in the buyer state-while the local sale would need absorb but
one, a manifestly unfair situation.
From another viewpoint one can likewise reconcile the gross receipts cases
with the Berwind-White decision by observing that the Court in passing upon
sales tax cases, apparently dispenses entirely with the test of whether there
is a "risk" of potential multiple burdens and employs a more practical ap-
proach. 8 That is, the Court will invalidate a sales or use tax only when the
complainant has established that the transaction involved has actually been
burdened by the duplicate taxation of two or more states. Unless this is
16This approach to the problem of sales taxes as interstate transactions was originally
discussed in Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rv.
617, published before the Berwind-White decision. The fact that the majority cited the
article strengthens the possibility that reasoning similar to Lockhart's forms the foun-
dation of the Berwind-White decision. That this may have been the case is hinted by
the following language of the minority opinion [60 Sup. Ct. 388, 404 (1940) J: "Doubtless
much can be said as to the desirability of a comprehensive system of taxation.... How-
ever important such a policy may be, it is not a matter for this Court."
The Felt & Tarrant and Du Grenier cases, decided on the same day as the Berwind-
White case, and resting solely upon the latter decision, are strong evidence that the
Court is striving to formulate a uniform system of state sales taxation by limiting sales
taxes to buyer states, for those cases presented wide-open possibilities of taxation by
the seller state. See supra note 8. Such a new standard of uniformity would not
only not interfere with but also would actually apply the apportionment theory of the
gross receipts tax doctrine, since the buyer state would be levying a tax on a selling
activity, whether interstate or local, within its borders, thereby apportioning its income
to transactions within its jurisdiction, whereas the seller state would be prohibited from
possibly taxing the same sale in the state of origin.
17At the height of the depression 22 states had not as yet adopted sales taxes. See
note (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 248.
18"A state, for many purposes is to be reckoned as a self-contained unit which may
frame its own system of burdens and exemptions without heeding systems elsewhere.
If there are limits to that power there is no need to mark them now. It will be time
enough to mhark them when the taxpayer, paying in the state of origin is compelled
again to pay in the state of destination." Cardozo, J., in Henneford v. Silas Mason
Company, 300 U. S. 577, 587, 57 Sup. Ct. 524 (1936). (Italics supplied.) See also
Southern Pacific Company v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 170, 50 Sup. Ct. 389 (1938).
Compare this language with that in Gwin, White, and Prince Company v. Henneford,
305 U. S. 434, 440, 59 Sup. Ct. 325 (1938) : "Unlawfulness of the burden depends upon
its nature measured in terms of its capacity to obstruct interstate commerce, and not
on the contingency that some other state may have subjected the commerce to a like
burden." (Italics supplied.)
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shown, the Court will restrict itself entirely to the inquiry of whether the tax
is discriminatory, i.e., whether it is applied alike to intrastate and interstate
commerce. 19 It may be expected, therefore, that the decision in O'Kane v.
State of New York will be upheld, and the "risk" test so much relied upon by
the minority 20 will not be resorted to as an index, since no proof of a duplicate
levy is made in the case. If the delivery in the Berwind-White case was re-
garded as a local event, despite its being an integral part of the interistate
transaction, it is difficult to conceive why the agreement or sale in the O'Kane
case cannot be similarly labeled. And the analogy of the use tax, if necessary
at all, is only slightly more adaptable in the Berwind-White situation than in
the principal case, since in neither one has the interstate activity come to an
end-a necessary requisite of any valid use tax.2 1
The final determination of the validity of a seller state sales tax such as
that of the principal case, may, in the last analysis, depend. on the personnel
of the Court itself. For three justices-Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas (Mr.
Justice Black particularly in his dissenting opinions in the Adams and Gwin
cases)-have indicated that the Court should concern itself only with the
question of actual discrimination by a state tax and that the solution of the
problem of multiple taxation, either existing or potential, is solely within the
province of Congress. 2 2  Inasmuch as the tax of the principal case is clearly
non-discriminatory, it may well be that Justices Black, Frankfurter, and
Douglas will again join with Justices Stone and Reed, the five constituting a
majority in favor of the tax. And although the latter two justices are pri-
marily concerned with the prevention of actual duplicate burdens, their
previous commitments are broad enough to permit their endorsement of the
position taken by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas. The underlying
policy of such a majority, therefore, may quite possibly be that in the absence
of discrimination and federal legislation restricting state taxation of inter-
state transactions, the Court will not disturb the existing tax structure of a
state by invalidating any of its sales tax enactments.
The foregoing analysis serves to illustrate that many questions bearing on
modern sales taxation have been left unanswered by the Berzoind-White de-
cision. It seems clear that in a good many cases the answers will hinge upon
the approach which the Court chooses from among the several herein dis-
cussed.
Louis POLLACK
19The Felt and Tarrant and Du Grenier cases, in both of which the Court ignored the
"risk!' test of the Adans and Gwin cases, illustrate that, in the absence of definite proof
of cumulative taxation, the courts in such sales cases will look only to the tax set-up
in the state whose tax is being challenged. See supra note 8. See also Johnson, Multi-
State Taxation of Interstate Sales (1938) 27 CAL.n L. REv. 549, 557.
20283 N. Y. 439, 450, 28 N. E. (2d) 905 (1940).2 1See Henneford v. Silas Mason Company, and Southern Pacific v. Gallagher, both
cited mipra note 18. See also the minority opinion in the Berwind.-White case [60
Sup. Ct. 388, 402 (1940)]: ". . . delivery in completion of the sale is as properly immune
from state taxation as is the transportation to the purchaser's dock."
22", . . . it would seem that only Congress has the power to formulate rules . . . to
protect interstate commerce from nerely possible future unfair burdens. . . . [By in-
validating the Indiana Gross Receipts Tax of 1933] an unjust and unfair burden is
actually imposed upon intrastate business because of an apprehension of a possible future
injury to interstate commerce." Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 328, 58 Sup. Ct. 913 (1938).
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Torts: Nuisance: Contributory negligence as defense.-Plaintiff tripped
over a board which covered a pipe running from an air compressor in
the street across the sidewalk to an excavation project of the defendant.
A permit had been obtained for the laying of the pipe. Plaintiff alleged
that the obstruction constituted negligence and nuisance. Defendant pleaded
contributory negligence. Held: This would be a valid defense either as
to. negligence or as to nuisance arising out of negligence. Delaney et al. v.
Philhern Realty Co. et al., 280 N. Y. 461, 21 N. E. (2d) 507 (1939). 1
There are two kinds of nuisanc -- public and private.2 Public nuisance
may be defined as a more or less continuous and substantial interference
with the health, comfort, safety, or right of passage on land or water of
the public generally.3 Private nuisance is a more or less continuous and
substantial invasion of a specific person's lawful use or enjoyment of his
land.4 This note has no bearing upon the public nuisance, except insofar
as a private individual can show that the public nuisance was to him a
private nuisance, inflicting upon him a particular and substantial injury.
This type of private nuisance is often called absolute nuisance, or nuisance
per se: the defendant is held absolutely because of the danger or inconvenience
he has created or because his actions are deemed to be nuisance by statute,
without regard to any intent or foreseeability on his part. There is another
kind of private nuisance appearing in our law: that which might be called
a "quasi-nuisance." This "quasi-nuisance" comprises any other substantial
disturbance or interference with a person's health, comfort, safety, or right
of passage on land or water which arises from and is dependent upon negli-
gence, trespass, or an intentional act, designated by the courts as "nuisance"
for the purpose of imposing positive liability upon the wrongdoer.
With these conceptions of nuisance before us, let us consider the possible
applications of the defense of contributory negligence in a "nuisance" action.
One view is that contributory negligence is not a bar to a nuisance action,
whatever the nuisance may be.5 Thus, by the device of labeling the wrong
a nuisance, the defendant is herd absolutely. The antithesis of this view
is the broad rule that contributory negligence may be pleaded as a defense
in all actions of nuisance.6 This is the equivalent of always treating nuisance
IThis case was briefly noted in (1939) 18 TEx. L. REv. 103. For a general note, see
Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Nuisance (1934) 29 ILL. L. REv. 372.21n general, see HAmR, TORTS (1933) §§ 179-181; JoYcE, NuisANcEs (1906) chs.
I, II; PEaCE AND MESTow, NuIsAcEs (1926) ch. I; Winfield, NuXisance as a Tort(1931) 4 CAMB. L. J. 189.
-
3This definition is substantially that offered in PEARCE AND MESTON, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 7. Public nuisance is a field all by itself. It is, if possible, more intangible and
all-inclusive than private nuisance. The chief distinguishing feature, of course, is an
offense against the public.4This definition is substantially that offered in Winfield, mpra note 2, at 190. This
is the traditional private nuisance, as evolved since the days of Blackstone (3 BL. CoMM.
*216), with none of the later ramifications that make "nuisance" a catch-all phrase.
5The following cases take this view, but it is to be noted that in all the nuisance
complained of was a traditional land nuisance: Watson v. New Milford, 72 Conn. 561,
45 AtI. 167 (1900) ; Bowmann v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa 234, 109 N. W. 714 (1906);
Baker v. City of Wheeling et al., 117 W. Va. 362, 185 S. E. 842 (1936).
GThe following cases take this view: Curtis v. Kastner, 220 Cal. 185, 30 P. (2d) 26
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as negligence so far as the defense of contributory negligence is concerned.
A third, and intermediate, theory is that stated in McFarlane v. City of
Niagara Falls.7 There, in a situation similar to the one in the instant case,
Chief Judge Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, ruled
that contributory negligence would be a defense to a nuisance arising out
of negligence, but that for absolute nuisance "something more than a mere
want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff is required to prevent
recovery." s  In Drake v. Corning Building Co., ' this rule was applied to
a controversy where defendant permitted a weighing machine to remain in
front of his store in violation of the city charter, and plaintiff tripped over it.
The court allowed the defense of contributory negligence to be raised, saying
that the continuance of the nuisance amounted to negligence.
The distinctions between nuisance and negligence are often difficult to
draw ;1O in fact, one English author would obliterate them, grouping "Negli-
(1934), criticized (1935) 19 MINN. L. Rav. 249; Baltimore v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160, 66
Am. Dec. 326 (1856) (dictum) ; McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213, 197 N. E.
879 (1935); Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621, 13 Am. Dec. 464 (Mass. 1824) (in both
Massachusetts cases, the rule is restricted to unlawful obstructions in the highway);
Delaney v. Philhern Realty Co., 280 N. Y. 461, 21 N. E. (2d) 507 (1939) (concurring
opinion of Crane, J.).
7247 N. Y. 340, 347, 160 N. E. 391, 57 A. L. R. 1, 7 (1928), noted (1928) 6 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 82, (1928) 2 ST. JOHN's L. R V. 233. In that case, plaintiff tripped over
ridge on the city sidewalk. The trial judge found that as a nuisance existed any
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was immaterial. Held: This was
error; "where the substance of the wrong is negligence, a plaintiff, though pleading
nuisance, is under a duty to show care [on his part] proportioned to the danger." The case
was remanded to determine whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent. For prior New
York decisions leading up to the McFarlane case, see Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y.
79 (1858) (excavation in street held to be nuisance and plaintiff allowed to recover,
there being no lack of due care on his part to avoid the injury) ; Muller v. McKesson
et al., 73 N. Y. 195 (1878) (liability for keeping ferocious watch-dog held absolute, and
plaintiff allowed to recover in absence of showing that he voluntarily brought injury
upon himself) ; Clifford v. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52 (1880) (plaintiff allowed to recover for
injury caused by falling through defendant's iron covering in sidewalk in the absence
of showing that he voluntarily jumped into the hole). For cases using the same prin-
ciple as the McFarlane case, see Hill v. Way, 117 Conn. 359, 168 Atl. 1 (1933), noted
(1933) 1 DUKE B. A. J. 67, (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 482; Hoffman v. City
of Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499 (1931) ; Hammond v. Monmouth County, 117
N. J. L. 11, 186 Atl. 482 (Sup. Ct. 1936), noted (1937) 35 Mica. L. REv. 684; Thomp-
son v. Petrozzello et al., 5 N. J. Misc. 645, 137 Atl. 835 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
SDelaney et al. v. Philhern Realty Co. et al., 280 N. Y. 461, 465, 21 N. E. (2d)
507 (1939). This case is a reaffirmance of the McFarlane case. See supra note 7.
9241 App. Div. 586, 272 N. Y. Supp. 726 (4th Dep't 1934).
'oE.g., see Hogle v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794 (1910),
where defendant's continued negligence in failing to use reasonable care to prevent its
workmen from throwing pieces of iron from factory windows onto plaintiff's property
was held to be equivalent to a nuisance. In this case the court, at page 393, made the
following significant statement: "The line between protracted and habitual negligence
and nuisance is not easily drawn, and facts may exist which call for damages on either
theory when the pleadings are appropriate, as this case, to either kind of relief." See
also Weston v. Troy, 139 N. Y. 281 (1893) (situation similar to the McFarlane case,
except that the plaintiff tripped over a ridge of ice; offense was held to be negligence
and plaintiff was required to show freedom from contributory negligence); Winfield,
Nuisance as a Tort (1931) 4 CAmB. L. J. 189, 197; Winfield, The History of Negligence
in the Law of Torts (1926) 42 L. Q. REv. 184; note (1915) 1 CORNELL L. Q. 55,
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gence, Trespass on and off the highway, statutory duties, Nuisance ...
under a common formula."" There being this overlapping, to hold arbi-
trarily that contributory negligence is never a defense in a nuisance action
works hardship in those cases of "quasi-nuisance" springing from con-
tinuing negligence; in such cases, the defendant's liability would depend
solely upon the theory of the action brought by the plaintiff.12 Likewise,
to hold strictly that contributory negligence is always a defense in a nuisance
action raises difficulties when the nuisance is a traditional private nuisance,
or is a nuisance resulting from an intentional act or trespass. The first
theory (that contributory negligence is not a defense) is properly applicable
to the absolute private nuisance; the second theory (that contributory negli-
gence is a defense) is proper in those nuisance actions which in their essence
are based on negligence. The formula set forth by Judge Cardozo in the
McFarlane case, therefore, adopts a fair and equitable mean between the
above opposing extremes. Thus, to defeat his recovery in an absolute
nuisance action, plaintiff's fault must be practically an assumption of the
risk. In "quasi-nuisances" which arise from negligence, contributory negli-
gence may be a valid defense. But whether the condition be labeled an
"absolute" nuisance or a "quasi-nuisance" the court should apply a flexible
standard of contributory fault, measured by "a duty (on the part of the
plaintiff) of reasonable vigilance in proportion to the risk,"'" which duty
must depend on the facts presented in each case.
The Delaney case and the Drake case show the application of Judge
Cardozo's rule of the McFarlane case in two different situations: in the
former the negligence amounted to a nuisance, and in the latter the con-
tinuation of the nuisance constituted negligence. It seems desirable that
such a distinction be made, for the reason that a specific instruction to the
jury as to the defense of contributory negligence in a case where the nuisance
merges into negligence is more effective than a general instruction as to the
defense in a case where the negligence gives rise to nuisance.
Frederick L. Turner
Trusts: Effect of exculpatory clause.-Exculpatory clauses in wills and
trust deeds are not new elements in the law of trusts.' Such clauses are in-
(1937) 21 MiNN. L. REv. 755. It is to be noted that in one of the earliest cases allow-
ing the defense of contributory negligence [Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60 (K. B.
1809) ], the defendant's wrong, that of placing an obstruction in the highway, could be
treated either as nuisance or as negligence.
-"Friedman, Nuisance, Negligence and the Overlapping of the Torts (1940) 3 Mon.
L. REv. 305, 309.
'
2Hogle v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794 (1910). See
supra note 10.
13McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 350, 160 N. E. 391 (1928).
'Pride v. Fooks, 2 Beav. 430 (Ch. 1839) ; Mucklow v. Fuller (Ch. 1821) Jac. 198, 37
Eng. Rep. 824; Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 247 (Ch. 1810) ; Bartlett v. Hodgson, 1 T.
R. 43, 99 Eng. Rep. 962 (Ch. 1785).
1940]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
serted by settlors and testators for the purpose of limiting the liability of the
trustee for acts done in relation to the trust. The decisions have not been in
agreement as to the interpretation and legal effect of these clauses.2 In
Matter of Rushmore's Estate, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 526 (Surr. Ct. 1940'), the
trustees of a testamentary trust claimed in an accounting proceeding that
the construction of the following exculpatory clause in the testator's will gave
them the power to invest trust funds in non-legal securities without liability
for resulting losses: "I direct that neither my executors nor my trustees shall
be held in any way liable for any act done or suffered to be done, thereunder,
and I direct neither of my executors nor trustees shall be held responsible
for the acts or defaults of the other." The Surrogate held that the language
in the will did not confer the power claimed by the trustees in the absence
of an express direction by the testator; that the true legal effect of the clause
was not to enlarge the powers of the trustees but to limit their liabilities
for acts done in good faith within the powers granted expressly by the will;
that they could not hold for any unreasonable length of time the non4egtal
securities received by them from the decedent, nor could they make new
investments in non-legals.
The decision by the Surrogate in giving the clause this legal effect as to
investment in non-legal securities3 is amply supported by authority, but the
interpretation of the clause as to possible future claims by the trustees remains
an open question. In the light of past cases, the interpretation of the clause
cannot be foretold.4
That a settlor or testator may declare that the trustee shall have adminis-
trative powers and freedom from liability beyond that implied by a court of
equity is too well settled to admit of doubt. 5 But public policy has placed
a limit on the extent to which immunity from liability can be granted to a
trustee since equity regards the beneficiary with a favored eye and will not
permit gross negligence or bad faith in the administration of the trust.6 The
2Connover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (Ch. 1917), aff'd,
89 N. J. Eq. 584, 106 Atl. 890 (1918) ; Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56 (1883). Compare
'lIt re Jarvis' Estate, 110 Misc. 5, -180 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Surr. Ct. 1920) with Tuttle
v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617, 3 Atl. 267 (1882), and with Wilkins v. Hogg, 31 L. J.
41 (Ch. 1861).
SWarren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (1909) ; Connover v. Guarantee Trust
Co., supra note 2; Matter of Mallon, 43 Misc. 569, 89 N. Y. Supp. 23 (Surr. Ct. 1904),
aff'd sub nom. Matter of Howard, 110 App. Div. 61, 97 N. Y. Supp. 23 (2d Dep't 1905),
aff'd ner., 185 N. Y. 539, 77 N. E. 1189 (1905) ; 2 ScOTT, TRuSTS (2d ed. 1939) § 222.1.
43 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUsTEEs (1935) § 542; 2 Scorr, op. cit. mipra note 3, § 222.2.
5Thompson v. Hays, 11 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 8th 1926) ; In re Leupp, 108 N. 3.
Eq. 49, 153 Atl. 842 (1931); Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931),
77 A. L. R. 499, 505 (1932); Matter of Kramer's Estate, 172 Misc. 598, 15 N. Y. S.(2d) 700 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Matter of Olmstead, 30 Misc. 350, 63 N. Y. Supp. 489
(Surr. Ct. 1900), mod., 52 App. Div. 515, 66 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd,
164 N. Y. 571, 58 N. E. 1090 (1901); North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 279
Mass. 471, 180 N. E. 217, 83 A. L. R. 606, 616 (1932); Merrell's Estate, 26 Pa. Dist.
323 (1916). Contra: Litchfield v. White, 7 N. Y. 438 (1852).
GBrowning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 231 (C. C. A. 3d 1918), cert. denied, 248
U. S. 564, 39 Sup. Ct. 9 (1919); Corbett v. Benioff, 126 Cal. App. 772, 14 P. (2d)
1028(1932) ; Cartier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E. 135 (1919) ; In re Andrus'
Will, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N. Y. Supp. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935), noted (1936) 20 MiNN.
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settlor is not permitted to grant the trustee absolute freedom from duty and
liability to the cestui que trust since this would encourage undesirable con-
duct and defeat the purpose of the. trust. No cases found have immunity
clauses which purport to give such exoneration from liability. Typical
exculpatory clauses exempt the trustee from liability for depreciation of
securities, 7 retention of securities,8 mistakes,9 errors in judgment,10 defalca-
tions of a co-trustee,"x and acts in reference to the trust other than bad
faith,'2 gross negligence' 3 or wilful default.14  No matter how broad the
provisions of an immunity clause, the trustee will be liable if he intentionally
or wilfully exceeds his trust powers,15 or acts with reckless indifference to
the interests of the beneficiary, or if he 'has personally profited through a
breach of trust' 6 Nor can the clause be given effect if it is inserted in the
trust instrument as a result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or con-
fidential relation to the settlor.17
English courts have given only limited effect to exculpatory clauses either
by strictly construing them' s or giving them no legal effect whatsoever.19
An early case stated that the exculpatory clause gave no more protection than
a court of equity would give in the absence of such a clause, and that such a
clause was infused in every will by implication2 0 The English decisions agree
L. REv. 210, (1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 475; N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 125; 2 ScoTT,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 222.3; 3 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 542.
7In re Carnell's Will, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 376 (1940); Drosier v. Brerton, 15 Beav.
221, 51 Eng. Rep. 521 (Ch. 1851).8Matter of Clark, supra note 5; Gould v. Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213 N. Y. Supp. 286(Sup. Ct. 1925).
9North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, supra note 5.
10In re Carnell's Will, supra note 7; Knox v. Mackinnon, 13 App. Cas. 753 (1888).
"Warren v. Pazolt, vtpra note 3; Pass v. Dundas, 43 L. T. 665 (Ch. 1889); Brum-
ridge v. Brumridge, 27 Beav. 5 (Ch. 1858).
12fligney v. Blanchard, 226 Mass. 335, 115 N. E. 424 (1917); Woodruff v. Freehold
Trust Co., 112 N. J. Eq. 405, 164 At. 411 (1933).
13Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617, 3 Atl. 267 (1882) ; April v. April, 272 N: Y.
331, 6 N. E. (2d) 43 (1936) ; Matter of Mallon, supra note 3.14Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930) ; In re Jarvis' Estate, 110
Misc. 5, 180 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Surr. Ct. 1920) ; Matter of Olmstead, supra note 5.
'
5 Corbett v. Benioff, 126 Cal. App. 772. 14 P. (2d) 1028 (1932) ; Digney v. Blanchard,
226 Mass. 335, 115 N. E. 424 (1917) ; Connover v. Guarantee Trust Co., supra note 2;
Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617, 3 Atl. 267 (1882); Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y.
56 (1883); Matter of Mallon, supra note 3; Rae v. Meek, 14 App. Cas. 558 (1889);
Chapman v. Broune, (1902) 1 Ch. 785; Brumridge v. Brumridge, 27 Beav. 5 (Ch. 1858).16In re Andrus' Will, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N. Y. Supp. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935), noted
(1936) 20 MiNx. L. REv. 210, (1936) 22 VA L. Rv. 475; RFsTATEMENT, TRusTs
(1935) § 222 (1).
1 7RESTATEm.,ENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 222 (2).
'sDrosier v. Brerton, 15 Beav. 221, 51 Eng. Rep. 521 (Ch. 1851) (holding that a
clause releasing liability for decrease in value of securities did not apply to money lent
on a second mortgage); Dbi v. Burford, 19 Beav. 409, 52 Eng. Rep. 408 (Ch. 1854)
(where exculpatory clause said no liability for losses in handling funds but court held
trustee liable for defalcations of co-trustee); Brumridge v. Brumridge, 27 Beav. 5
(Ch. 1858) ; Rae v. Meek, 14 App. Cas. 558 (1889).
t9Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 247 (Ch. 1858); Rehden v. Wesley, 29 Beav. 213, 54
Eng. Rep. 609 (Ch. 1861); Pride v. Fooks, 2 Beav. 430 (Ch. 1839) ; Bartlett v. Hodg-
son, 1 T. R. 42 (Ch. 1785); LEwiN, TRUSTS (13th ed. 1928) 249.20Dawson v. Clarke, supra note 19.
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that an immunity clause affords no protection for gross negligence, 21 posi-
tive breaches of duty,22 known misapplication by co-trustee,23 or wilful de-
fault and bad faith.2 The two most extreme English cases hold that the "
ordinary equity rules covering the liability of a trustee were superseded by a
broad immunity clause which was construed to protect the trustees who had
committed positive breaches of trust and had given complete management of
funds to a co-trustee who had embezzled and misapplied them.25 Because of
the strictness of the decisions, statutes were passed in 1861, 1896, and 1925.
The English Trustee Act of 1925 provides statutory immunity in a large
number of cases and gives the court power to excuse the trustee from lia-
bility for breach of trust, where he has acted "honestly and reasonably."26
These statutes have been liberally construed.2 7
American courts have used varying interpretations when dealing with
exculpatory clauses. At least five principles have been applied in such cases:
(1) The clause may not be discussed at all if the court decides that the
trustee has been guilty of gross neglect of trust duties ;28 (2) If the trustee
has used reasonable care and diligence it will not be necessary to interpret
the legal effect of the clause ;29 (3) A strict construction of the terms of the
whole trust deed may be applied as contrasted with a claim of restriction of
liability through the clause ;30 (4) If the limit of powers of the trustee is
well defined by the trust instrument and general rules of law the only effect
of the exculpatory clause is to limit liability for losses incurred, while acting
within the defined powers, which are due to mistaken judgment or error
in discretion;31 and (5) The clause may give no more immunity than a court
21Rae v. Meek, 14 App. Cas. 558 (1889); Drosier v. Brerton, 15 Beav. 221, 51
Eng. Rep. 521 (Ch. 1851) ; see Carruthers v. Carruthers, (1896) A. C. 659.22Rae v. Meek, supra note 21; Knox v. Mackinnon, 13 App Cas. 753 (1888) ; Pride v.
Fooks, supra note 19; cf. Rehden v. Wesley, 29 Beav. 213, 54 Eng. Rep. 609 (Ch. 1861).
23Dix v. Burford, 19 Beav. 409, 52 Eng. Rep. 408 (Ch. 1851); Mucklow v. Fuller,
[18211 Jac. 198, 37 Eng. Rep. 824; Brumridge v. Brumridge, 27 Beav. 5 (Ch. 1858).24Knox v. Mackinnon, 13 App. Cas. 753 (1888); see Brumridge v. Brumridge, 27
Beav. 5 (Ch. 1858).25Wilkins v. Hogg, 31 L. J. Ch. 41 (1861) (court wished it might disregard immunity
clause, in view of facts, and force a trustee's duties on defendants, but public policy
would not permit) ; Pass v. Dundas, 43 L. T. 665 (Ch. 1865) (saying immunity clause
should protect innocent trustee from surcharge for misdealings of his co-trustee).2015 Geo. V, c. 19. Section 30 provides for immunities in specifically enumerated in-
stances. Section 62 provides that the court should be lenient when it feels that the
trustee has acted in good faith, and honestly and reasonably.27Carruthers v. Carruthers, [1896) A. C. 659 (construing the Act of 1861) ; Perrnes v.
Ballamy, 1 Ch. 797 (1899) (construing Trustees' Act of 1896); Chapman v. Broune,
1 Ch. 795 (1902); Palmer v. Emerson, 1 Ch. 758 (1911).
28Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bland Ch. 264 (Md. 1830) ; Digney v. Blanchard, 226 Mass.
335, 115 N. E. 424 (1917) ; First Trust Co. v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 254 N. W.
569 (1934).20North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N. E. 217, 83 A. L. R.
607, 616 (1932) ; Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930) ; Matter of
Kramer's Estate, 172 Misc. 598, 15 N. Y. (2d) 700 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Merrell's Estate,
25 Pa. Dist. 323 (1916).
30Cf. Corbett v. Benioff, 126 Cal. App. 772, 14 P. (2d) 1028 (1932); Connover v.
Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 470, 102 Atl. 844 (Ch. 1917), af'd, 89 N. J. Eq. 584,
106 At. 890 (1918) ; Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. 3. Eq. 617, 3 Atl. 267 (1882).31First Nat. Bank of Patterson v. Jersey Central Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 242, 170 Atl. 209
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of equity can give.3 2 The only unanimity occurs in the holding that the law,
dictated by considerations of public policy, established a point beyond which
the parties cannot agree to relieve a trustee from liability for breach of duty. 33
An exculpatory clause similar in wording to that found in the instant case
appears in North Ada;ms National Bank v. Curtiss,34 where the trustees were
freed from liability for retention of securities in a falling market, poor
diversification, and failure to invest in bonds, because the acts were done in
good faith.
The courts have indulged in vague discussions of the meaning of "gross
negligence," "wilful default" and "wilful," 35 frequently construing an inno-
cent mistake or careless, ignorant act as an intentional or wilful breach of
trust.30 Two New York cases are found where almost identical fact situa-
tions existed. In one case the court called an act "gross negligence" in order
to hold the trustee liable and evade the protection of an exculpatory
clause;37 in the other where there was no such immunity clause, the court
calling a like act mere "negligence" again held the trustee liable.38
It would seem from the cases considered that the protective force of the
exculpatory clause is largely in the discretion of the court. The general rule,
if one exists, would seem to be as stated in Matter of Rushmore's Estate,,
that the legal effect of the exculpatory clause is not to enlarge the powers'of
the trustee but rather to restrict his liabilities.39 There are cases, however,
where the trustee's powers have been clearly defined by the trust instrument,
yet certain of his actions which were clear breaches of trust duty were held
to be immune from liability solely on the basis of the weight accorded to an
exculpatory clause.40
It is submitted that in light of common-law authority the court in Matter
(1934) ; Woodruff v. Freehold Trust Co., 112 N. J. Eq. 405, 164 Atl. 411 (1933); April
v. April, 272 N. Y. 331, 6 N. E. (2d) 43 (1936) ; Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56 (1883)
(leading New York case) ; Matter of Mallon, 43 Misc. 569, 89 N. Y. Supp. 544 (Surr.
Ct. 1904), aff'd sub norn. Matter of Howard, 110 App. Div. 61, 97 N. Y. Supp. 23 (2d
Dep't 1905), aff'd inem., 185 N. Y. 539, 77 N. E. 1189 (1905) ; Matter of Olmstead,
30 Misc. 350, 63 N. Y. Supp. 489 (Surr. Ct. 1900), mod., 52 App. Div. 515, 66 N. Y.
Supp. 212 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd, 164 N. Y. 571, 58 N. E. 1090 (1900) ; 65 C. J. § 702 (2).
321) re Jarvis' Estate, 110 Misc. 5, 180 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Surr. Ct. 1920) ; see Litch-
field v. White, 7 N. Y. 438, 440 (1852).
3 3 Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d 1918), cert. denied,
248 U. S. 564, 39 Sup. Ct. 9 (1919) ; Litchfield v. White, supra note 32; In re Andrus'
Will, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N. Y. Supp. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; 3 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 542; 2 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 222.3.
34278 Mass. 471, 180 N. E. 217, 83 A. L. R. 607, 616 (1932).3 5 Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra note 33.36Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. 3. Eq. 617, 3 Atl. 267 (1882) ; April v. April, supra note 31;
Hart's Estate, 203 Pa. 480 (1902).3 7 17 re Jarvis' Estate, 110 Misc. 5, 180 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Surr. Ct. 1920) (covering
retention of bonds by a trustee).3 SMatter of Garvin, 256 N. Y. 518, 177 N. E. 24 (1931) (covering retention of stocks
by a trustee).3 9 Tuttle v. Gilmore, supra note 36; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381
(1909) ; 2 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 222.1.4 0 Warren v. Pazolt, supra note 39; Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56 (1883); In re
Knower's Estate. 121 Misc. 208, 200 N. Y. Supp. 777 (Surr. Ct. 1923); Wilkins v.
Hogg, 31 L. J. Ch. 41 (1861).
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of Rushmore's Estate correctly determined the legal effect of the exculpatory
clause. If the settlor had died subsequent to April 2, 1938 the clause might
well have been stricken from the will under Section 125 of the New York
Decedent Estate Law for being so broad in its grant of immunity as to be
void as, against public policy.
Donald R. Harter
Unfair Competition: Adoption of numbering system and use of com-
parative lists.-Plaintiffs, the largest manufacturers in the world of un-
breakable watch crystals, sought to restrain, as unfair competition, the fol-
lowing trade practices used by defendant, their largest competitor: (1) sell-
ing of watch crystals in blue envelopes of almost identical size and shade
that plaintiffs used for their crystals; (2) offering to the trade a gauge or
ruler based on the same arbitrary system of measurement as that developed
by plaintiffs to measure the crystals, although different in shape and carrying
defendant's trade-mark; (3) placing of watch crystals in ribbed glassine
envelopes after plaintiffs had made use of a similar envelope for their fancy
crystals; (4) use of a numbering system based upon that of the plaintiffs
and having a uniform numerical difterence for each crystal of exactly two
hundred from the number given to crystals of similar size manufactured by
plaintiffs; (5) use of a comparative list setting forth the various numbers
contained in plaintiffs' numbering system and opposite each such number the
defendant's number for the same sized crystal; and (6) the practice of plac-
ing upon certain of defendant's envelopes containing watch crystals, the
plaintiffs' numbers for the same sized crystals. Plaintiffs had exchanged
in trade many cabinets and stocks of crystals sold to retailers by the defend-
ant, substituting, among the former customers of' the defendant, the plaintiffs'
cabinets and crystals designated by the plaintiffs' size mark. Held: The
defendant's acts do not constitute unfair competition. Injunction denied.
Germanow et al. v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, Inc., 283 N. Y. 1,
27 N. E. (2d) 212 (1940).'
Neither Congress, state legislatures, nor the courts have established a
complete and satisfactory definition of what acts constitute unfair competi-
tion. Not all practices opposed to good morals or public policy amount to un-
fair competition. Consequently, there are many "dirty tricks" in business
which the courts do not restrain.2 Since many objectionable trade practices
can now be suppressed by the Federal Trade Commission or by prosecutions
under the Sherman Act, there has been less demand to restrain them by private
injunctions. These proceedings, however, have had little effect in widening the
scope of unfair competition in private litigation. Courts are agreed that stand-
ardized passing off (i.e., where one manufacturer attempts to sell his goods
'Other facts of the case: neither plaintiffs nor defendant sell to the public but only
to jewelers, retailers, or jobbers, so the public is not deceived; there was no proof that
there was a palming or passing off of defendant's goods as those of plaintiffs by the
defendant when it sold its products.2Acy v. Whaley, 281 Ky. 400, 136 S. W. (2d) 575 (1940).
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to the public as those of another) can be stopped, but their attitude toward
other trade practices is a matter of speculation. The word "unfair" excludes
much shabby conduct and includes some honest conduct.3 Public sentiment
has swung away from the rule of caveat emptor and now demnands honesty,
but the fact that a given method of competition makes it difficult for com-
petitors to do business successfully does not of itself brand that method of
competition as unlawful and unfair. What is unfair competition, therefore,
must be determined with particular reference to the character and circum-
stances of the business in its competitive conditions. 4
In determining what constitutes unfair competition the court must attempt
to balance the prevention of monopoly with the necessity of maintaining free
competition.5 Since jewelers are adverse to purchasing two cabinets, to
prohibit the comparative lists and comparative numbers on the envelopes sup-
plied by competitors would create or tend to create a virtual monopoly for
the plaintiffs. A series of letters or numbers used solely to describe and dis-
tinguish the sizes, styles, grades, or qualities of articles in commerce, and not
to describe source of origin, constitutes a "system of doing business" and
not a property right, and consequently may not be preEmpted so as to create
a monopoly. 6 Plaintiffs were claiming a perpetual right to the use of size
numbers which was far greater than any right obtainable under laws re-
lating to trade-marks. Material misrepresentations in the use of a trade-
mark, name, or label will defeat the right of the owner to relief in equity
against an infringement or imitation by others.7 Although the defense of
unclean hands in the field of unfair competition appears limited to such cases
of misrepresentation, the writer suggests that its application should be ex-
tended to circumstances such as existed in this case. It appears to the writer
that the plaintiffs had attempted to "squeeze" the defendant and other com-
petitors by the "trade-ins" of the cabinets and stocks of crystals, conduct
which should justify the application of the doctrine of unclean hands.
Well settled principles dispose of the remaining alleged unfair practices.
One cannot have a trade-mark monopoly in the color of paper alone in
3Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289. Other recent articles in
the field of unfair competition are Callman, What is Unfair Competition? (1940) 28
GEo. L. J. 585; Sadtler, Unfair Competition--Past and Present Trends (1940) 16
TENN. L. REV. 400.4See Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935); Fed-
eral Trade Com'n. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d
1932) ; Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E. 133 (1921).5Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Triangle Mech Lab. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 319 (E. D. N. Y.
1933); Coca-Cola Co. v. Hy-Po Co., 1 F. Supp. 644 (E. D. N. Y. 1932); Dress Circle,
Inc. v. Franklin Simon & Co., Inc., 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 225 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Sherwood v.
20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 173 Misc. 871, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 388 (Sup. Ct. 1940):
GDixie Vortex Co. v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 95 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 2d 1938);
Speaker v. Shaler Co., 87 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; M. J. Lewis Products Co.
v. Lewis, 57 F. (2d)' 886 (E. D. Pa. 1931); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Scharf Tag, Label
& Box Co., 135 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 6th 1905) ; Clipper Belt Lacer Co. v. Detroit Lacer
Co., 223 Mich. 399, 194 N. W. 125 (1923).
7Ubeda v. Zialcita, 226 U. S. 452, 33 Sup. Ct. 165 (1913) ; Worden v. California Fig
Syrup Co., 187 U. S. 516, 23 Sup. Ct. 161 (1903) ; Four Roses Products Co. v. Small
Grain Distilling & Drug Co., 29 F. (2d) 959 (App. D. C. 1928); Brooten v. Oregon
Kelp Ore Products Co., 24 F. (2d) 498 (C. C. A. 9th 1928).
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absence of a finding that it has acquired by use a secondary meaning. 8 When
the form of an article or package is a functional expedient not adopted to
indicate source of manufacture it is not subject to exclusive appropriation as
a trade-mark in the absence of a finding it has acquired a secondary mean-
ing.' A gauge or ruler graduated in fractions of an inch for measuring is a
mathematical scale and if it or the measurements it makes are not used as
trade-marks, then there is no exclusive right to its use and it is available to
anyone. 10  No secondary meaning had been acquired by plaintiffs for the
color and form of its envelopes nor had they used the gauge or its measure-
ments as trade-marks.
The case stands then on the broad general principle that mere adoption of
a competitor's business methods is not in itself unfair competition."
Edward R. Moran
Wills: Incorporation by reference of an amendable trust: Effect of sub-
sequent amendments.-The question "What is the limitation of the New
York doctrine of incorporation by reference?" again arises in President &
Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N. Y. S.
(2d) 232 (2d Dep' 1940). In 1933 tho testator created an inter vivos trust,
reserving the power to amend or revoke the trust by an instrument in writing
to be delivered to the trustee, the Manhattan Company. During the next
two years the testator made two supplemental trust indentures, changing
some beneficiaries and varying the interests of others. In 1935 he executed
his will. By the third article of that will he left most of'his property to the
Manhattan Company to be administered in accordance with the terms of the
trust agreement, although its terms were not restated in the will. On the
same day that the testator executed his will he made a third supplemental
trust indenture which was not delivered to the trustee until after the exe-
cution of his will. The effect of this third trust amendment was to eliminate
certain beneficiaries and to reduce drastically the widow's share. One month
later the testator executed and delivered to the trustee a fourth trust amend-
ment, substituting one charitable beneficiary for another. The Special Term
of the Supreme Court held' that the will incorporated the trust together with
8Andrews Jergens Co. v. Bonded Products Corporation, 21 F. (2d) 419 (C. C. A. 2d
1927); Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. A. & J. Mfg. Co., 20 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A.
2d 1927); Smith-Kline & French Co. v. American Drug Syndicate, 273 Fed. 84
(C. C. A. 2d 1921).9Soci6t6 Anonyme de La Distillerie v. Puziello, 250 Fed. 928 (E. D. N. Y. 1918);
Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Mosesian, 84 Cal. App. 485, 258 Pac. 630 (1927).
IONoll v. inex Laboratories Co., 25 F. Supp. 239 (N. D. Ohio 1935); Affiliated En-
terprises, Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. Ill. 1937); Buob et al. v.
Brown Carriage Co., 11 Ohio App. 266 (Ct. of App., Hamilton County, 1919).
"1Dixie Vortex Co. v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 95 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 2d 1938);
Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 78 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 2d 1935) ; Kaeser
& Blair v. Merchants' Ass'n., 64 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 6th 1933) ; William H. Keller,
Inc. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 298 Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 7th 1923).
1172 Misc. 290, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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the two amendments which were made to it prior to the execution of the
will and the third trust amendment which was executed or the same day as
the will but not delivered to the trustee until later. The Appellate Division,
one justice dissenting, reversed and held that article three of the will was
invalid. The court held that to allow the incorporation of the trust as
amended by the four supplemental trust indentures would be to allow the
testator to alter his will by an instrument not published and attested as
required by the Statute of Wills; to allow the incorporation of the trust with
only three supplemental trust indentures would defeat the purpose of the
testator.
In most states the doctrine of incorporation by reference is applied where
there is a valid will clearly expressing the testator's intention to incorporate
therein another writing existing at the time of the execution of the will,
provided it can be identified by satisfactory proof.2 A minority of states have
refused to recognize the doctrine, fearing that the incorporation of unattested
papers would open the door to fraud.3
New York formerly accepted the orthodox doctrine of incorporation by
reference, at least up to 1881, 4 but it was subsequently rejected.5 Since 1918,
two decisions have qualified the limits placed upon the doctrine in New York.
In Matter of Fowles6 the testator and his wife executed wills on the same
day before sailing on the Lisitania. The testator gave his wife a power of
appointment which she exercised in her will. His will also provided that he
should be deemed to have survived his wife in the event of a common
disaster.7 The court held that a testator could incorporate into his own will
the provisions of the will of another, whether that other will antedated or
was subsequent to the testator's will. In writing the majority opinion, Judge
Cardozo declared that the application of the rule against incorporation was
not to be carried to "a drily logical extreme."
Fourteen years later, in Matter of Rausch,9 the testator created an inter
vivos trust for the benefit of his feeble-minded daughter. By his will he left
a fifth of his residuary estate to the trustee of the inter uivos trust, stipulating
2The leading cases probably are Allen v. Murdock, 11 Moore P. C. C. 427 (1858),
and Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91, 39 Am. Rep. 433 (1881). There
are numerous other cases: Keeler v. Merchant's Loan & Trust Co., 253 Ill. 528, 97
N. E. 1061 (1912) ; Ex parte Hull, 164 Md. 39, 163 AtI. 819 (1933) ; In re McClure's
Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 165 Atl. 24 (1933). See ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) § 143.3Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 Atl. 1058 (1907) ; MVurray v. Lewis, 94 N. J.
Eq. 681, 121 Atl. 525 (1923).4Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153 (1881); Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369 (1879);
Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N. Y. 140 (1850).5Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 247, 28 N. E. 238 (1891). For a detailed
study of the New York decisions see REPORT, RECOMIENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE
LAW REVISION ComilSsioN (1935) 431-438.6222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918), noted (1918) 3 CORNELL L. Q. 320, (1918)
31 HAuv. L. REv. 1170, (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 673.
7As to the validity of the survivorship provisions see (1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 317.8Matter of Fowles, snpra note 6, at 233.
9258 N. Y. 327, 179 N. E. 755, 80 A. L. R. 98, 103 (1932). The case was noted
in (1932) 6 CiNc. L. REV. 295, (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 917, (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv.
564, (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rrv. 507.
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that it was to be held on the safie terms as; those embodied in the trust deed,
without restating its terms. This time on behalf of a unanimous court,
Judge Cardozo held "the legacy when given was not the declaration of a
trust, but the enlargement of the subject-matter of a trust declared already."'1
The reason for his conclusion was "the mind rebels against the formalism
that would invalidate a bequest for no better reason than the omission to
state the purpose of the trust again."'" An existing trust was regarded as a
legal fact of independent significance.
These two decisions were generally believed to have relaxed the New
York rule against incorporation by reference, at least to the extent of allow-
ing the incorporation of wills, trust indentures and other formal documents,
where there is admittedly little chance of fraud.'2
In the principal case, the court attempted to distinguish the Rausch case
by assuming that the Rausch case was a whimsical exception to the inflexible
New York rule against incorporation by reference. In the principal case the
trust was amendable and revocable; the court stressed the fact that in the
Rausch case the trust was unamendable and irrevocable. It is a matter of
controversy whether Judge Cardozo could have intended that any qualifica-
tion of the rule should be based on that distinction since it cannot be ascer-
tained from his opinion in the Rausch case whether that trust was unamend-
able and irrevocable or not.
Although there is not a great deal of authority on the point, New Jersey
has upheld a reference to a revocable trust;13 California has allowed the
incorporation of an amendable and revocable trust where there were no
attempted amendments. 14 An Ohio case, Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co.,' 5
was the first to allow the incorporation of the original terms of an amendable
trust deed although it was amended subsequent to the execution of the will.
The Ohio court advanced the novel theory that the incorporation of the trust
agreement in the settlor's will constituted a waiver of his right to amend
except by an instrument complying with the Statute of Wills. Within a year,
on the same facts, the Massachusetts court reached the same result in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Clevelapd'6 on the theory that the testator would prefer
10258 N. Y. 327, 331, 179 N. E. 755 (1932).
"Ibid.
12See ATKINSON, W.Ls (1937) § 143, n. 37; note (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 479, 482.
Surrogates Slater and Howell apparently labored under the same belief: Matter of
Bremer, 156 Misc. 160, 281 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1935) ; and Matter of Tiffany, 157 Misc. 863,
285 N. Y. Supp. 971 (1935).
'
3 Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N. J. Eq. 294, 140 At1. 279 (1928). The decision was
not rendered on the basis of the doctrine of incorporation by reference. The New
Jersey court reasoned that the testator merely added property to a trust fund established
by him years before the execution of his will.
'
4Estate of Wiley, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (1900). Contra: Atwood v. Rhode Island
Hospital, 275 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 1st 1921), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 661 (1922). The
Atwood case has been vigorously criticized: (1922) 35 Hcv. L. REv. 625. See Scott,
Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 521. See also RESTATEErNT,
TRUSTS, § 54.
1549 Ohio App. 490, 197 N. E. 419 (1934), noted (1936) 21 CORNFELL L. Q. 492,
(1935) 9 CImc. L. RZ~v. 279, (1936) 49 HARV. L. REV. 498, (1935) 2 Oio ST. L. 3. 72.
16291 Mass. 380, 196 N. E. 920 (1935). Professor Bogert approves of the Koeninger
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to have his property pass under the trust deed as it stood at the date of the
will, rather than have it pass by intestacy.
Professor Scott'7 takes the position that the courts should permit the
testator to add by will to his inter vivos trust, where th6 trust is amendable
and has been amended subsequent to the execution of the will, because
there is no reason why the property should not pass in acc6rdance with the
terms of the trust as amended at the date of the testator's death.
The result reached in the principal case seems undesirable. There is little
danger of fraud or mistake in this type of situation. In the Rausch, case the
possibility of incorporating an oral trust was expressly ruled out.' 8 The deci-
sion in the principal case involves a total disregard of the carefully drawn
trust which the testator has designated as the medium through which his
property shall be distributed and substitutes therefor a formal distribution
under the laws of intestacy.
The theory of the Koeninger case, although it involves a partial disregard
of the testator's wishes in that the trust amendments subsequent to the exe-
cution of the will are ignored, furnishes a workable rule. The position advo-
cated by Professor Scott is perhaps equally sound and can be justified in
New York on the basis of the Fowles and Rausch cases.
Ralph H. German
and Old Colony Trust cases, and concludes: "If a living trust has been created and the
settlor thereafter executes a will leaving property to the trustees of the living trust,
and the living trust is thereafter amended as to beneficiaries, and later the will takes
effect, the property passing by will goes to the trustees of the living trust for the
beneficiaries as they existed at the time of the execution of the will." 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 106.
17"If the testamentary trust can be upheld upon the ground that the terms of the
testamentary trust are determined by facts of independent significance, and the inter vivos
trust as it exists from time to time is such a fact, there would seem to be no; objection
to permitting the property passing by the will to be added to the inter vivos trust in
accordance with the terms of the trust as they are at the death of the testator, even
though they were modified after the excution of the will." 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 299.18258 N. Y. 327, 331, 179 N. E. 755 (1932).
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